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NOTES
Affirmation of the Purchaser-Seller Limitation:
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
In 1963 the United States brought a civil antitrust action against Blue Chip
Stamp Company, charging the company with monopolization of the trading
stamp business in California. In 1967 the district court entered a consent
decree which required Blue Chip Stamp Company to be merged into a new
company-Blue Chip Stamps.' Under the reorganization plan the holdings
of the majority stockholders in Blue Chip Stamp Company were to be
reduced and Blue Chip Stamps was required to offer a substantial number
of its shares to retail users of the stamp service who had not owned shares
in the old company. In 1970 plaintiff-retailer filed the present class suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California against
the old and new companies, eight of the nine shareholders having majority
control of Blue Chip Stamp Company, and the directors of Blue Chip Stamps.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated the antifraud provisions of SEC
rule lOb-5 'by including an overly pessimistic appraisal of the company in the
prospectus circulated pursuant to the consent decree, in order to dissuade
the plaintiff class from accepting what was intended to be a bargain offer,
so that the rejected shares might be offered to the public at a higher price.
The complaint further alleged that class members had failed to purchase the
offered shares in reliance upon these false and misleading statements. The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief might be granted. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs' position and reversed the district court."
Held, reversed: In order for plaintiffs to maintain a private action for dam-
ages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, they must be actual purchasers or
sellers of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917,
44L. Ed. 2d 539 (1975).
I. THE BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
An implied private right of civil recovery exists for violation of section
10(b) 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and for violation of rule 10b-
1. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
2. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
()" To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate-in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
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55 promulgated under that Act by the Securities Exchange Commission.6 Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp.7 established the requirement that the plaintiff
in a private action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 be a
purchaser or seller of securities. In Birnbaum minority stockholders of the
corporation brought a derivative action under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 against the corporation and its president and controlling stockholder, al-
leging that the defendant-president had rejected a highly profitable merger of-
fer and instead had sold his controlling interest at a premium. The plaintiffs
contended that misrepresentations made by the defendant to the stockholders
concerning the sale constituted fraudulent practices in connection with the
sale of securities, thereby violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The
Second Circuit dismissed the action, stating that section 10(b) was directed
solely at that type of fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase
or sale of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs, and that rule lOb-5 "extended protection only to the defrauded pur-
chaser or seller."'8 The corporation was not a party to the sale of control
and, therefore, did not fall within either protected class.
Expansion of the Purchaser-Seller Limitation. To allow redress for victims
of fraudulent schemes in securities transactions the courts have devised flex-
ible interpretations of the restrictive purchaser-seller limitation announced in
Birnbaum. Indeed, the doctrine was interpreted so liberally by some courts
that other courts were led to believe that Birnbaum had been completely
abrogated.9
One method of expansion was to allow plaintiffs to bring actions under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 as "forced sellers." This exception is exempli-
fied by the case of Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.10 where a plaintiff-stock-
holder in a corporation acquired by short form merger was considered a
"forced seller" since his only alternative to selling his stock at a discount was
to hold stock in a non-existent corporation." In another case applying this
5. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. Although neither § 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 expressly provides a civil remedy for
its violation, the courts have interpreted its language to imply a private right of action.
See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See gen-
erally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAw: FRAUD, § 2.4, at 27-40 (1974); 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1763 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5:
An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
7. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
8. Id. at 464.
9. See, e.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Symington
Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1967).
10. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
11. The court remarked that "[s]ince in order to realize any value for his stock [the
plaintiff] must exchange the shares for money from [defendant], as a practical matter
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exception, Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,12 the court granted injunc-
tive relief under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 to minority shareholders who
alleged that the majority stockholder was engaging in market manipulation
in order to drive the price of the stocks down and force plaintiffs to sell their
holdings at depressed prices.1"
An exception to the purchaser-seller requirement has also been recognized
in cases where the plaintiffs were aborted or delayed purchasers or sellers.
In one such case plaintiff-stockholder was allowed to maintain a cause of
action by alleging that defendant-stockbroker had fraudulently induced him
to refrain from selling his stocks until the market price had declined. The
fraud alleged was not in the actual sale-but in the aborted sale.14 In Travis
v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.15 defendant-tender-offeror fraudulently induced
American shareholders to hold their shares, while it acquired controlling
interest in the corporation from foreign stockholders. Later, after defendant
controlled the market for the stock, the American shareholders sold at a sub-
stantially lower price than that of the original offer. The court found it
unnecessary to expand the coverage of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because
it was of the opinion that the alleged fraud was connected with the sale of
securities.' 6 In a similar case, a plaintiff was allowed to maintain an action
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as the holder of an irrevocable ninety-
day option to purchase securities on grounds that he had been influenced by
[plaintiff] must eventually become a party to a 'sale,' as that term has always been
used." Id. at 634. See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967), in which the court was of the opin-
ion that "an acquisition or disposition of securities in exchange for other securities falls
within the statutory definitions [of 'purchase' and 'sale'] and that this reasoning ap-
plies to the case of merger." Id. at 266. A similar rationale was used by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The Court allowed a cause
of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 where plaintiff shareholders of a new corpora-
tion formed by merger had "purchased" shares in the corporation by exchanging them
for their old stock. Id. at 467.
12. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
13. There is serious doubt in this case as to whether the court would have allowed
plaintiff's suit if the claim had been for damages. The court noted that the allegations
would not support a claim for monetary damages because the causal connection between
the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of any security was slight since the plaintiffs
had not sold their stock. But the court was not directly faced with this issue since plain-
tiff's claim was for equitable relief. The court relied upon SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963) (not necessary in suit for equitable relief to establish all ele-
ments required in suit for monetary damages). 384 F.2d at 547.
14. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also A.T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972),
the court attempted to harmonize this line of cases with Birnbaum by noting that in
each case, though plaintiffs were not actual purchasers or sellers, a contractual relation-
ship existed between the parties which "elevated the plaintiffs to the status of statutory
purchasers or sellers." Id. at 345. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3c(a) (13),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1970) provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Section 3c(a)(14) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970) provides: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Though a contract for the purchase or sale
of securities is sufficient to satisfy the Birnbaum requirement, it is questionable that such
contracts existed in these cases.
15. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 521. For a discussion concerning interpretation of the "in connection
with" clause language, see Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the
Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1019 n.55 (1973).
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defendant's misrepresentations not to exercise the option within the ninety-
day period. 17
In cases of unsuccessful tender offers, the courts have reached inconsistent
results in determining whether claims of fraud should be allowed under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 8 In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp.'9 the court disallowed the claim of an unsuccessful tender offeror who
alleged that officers of the target corporation had misrepresented facts to
shareholders which induced them to retain their shares. 20' In a similar tender
offer case 2' the offeror was allowed to sue under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 when he made a tender offer to defendant corporation which then
allegedly conspired with a third party to purchase defendant's stock on the
open market, thereby driving the market price above that of the tender
offer.22
In the only Supreme Court case which touched upon the purchaser-seller
limitation issue, Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life,28 the Court
noted that Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose
of avoiding frauds to be construed not technically and restrictively, but flex-
ibly, to effectuate its remedial purposes. 24  In accordance with this liberal
approach, the Court held that a remedy existed under rule 1Ob-5 for injury
sustained as a result of fraudulent insider activity notwithstanding the fact
that an adequate state law remedy existed. This decision seems to modify
the substantive holding of Birnbaum which has been interpreted as disallow-
ing action against insiders under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 where an ade-
quate state remedy exists. 25  However, the Court did not discuss the pro-
cedural purchaser-seller limitation but instead noted that the corporation was
protected by the Act as seller of a security.
Rejection of the Purchaser-Seller Limitation. The -rigid purchaser-seller
limitation on standing to sue has long been criticized by commentators,26 and
1.7. Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), alf'd, 471
F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973). The court expressed the opinion that the holder of a 90-day
irrevocable offer was placed in a "status beyond that of a mere aborted purchaser." 346
F. Supp. at 1299 n.4.
18. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended in 1968 by § 14(e) which
deals with fraudulent practices in tender offers. Case law indicates that standing may
be easier to obtain under § 14(e) than under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969).
19. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
20. The court, following Birnbaum, stated that Iroquois was not complaining that
it was misled by the acts of defendants as to any purchases or sales by it of Syracuse
China stock, but instead was complaining that because of the acts of defendants it could
not purchase such shares. Id. at 967.
21. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
22. Crane may be distinguished from Iroquois by the fact that Crane was forced
to sell the shares he did acquire under threat of a divestiture action under the antitrust
laws. Id. at 798.
23. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In this case, Manhattan Corp. was deceived by one of its
officers into selling its U.S. Treasury bonds. The proceeds were not received by the
corporation, but instead were fraudulently misappropriated by the defendants.
24. Id. at 12.
25. See Comment, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Require-
ment under 10b-5, 6 LOYOLA U. Cir. L.J. 230, 237 n.34 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, Standing To Sue Under SEC Rule lob-5, 49
TExAs L. REV. 617 (1971); Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls
[Vol. 29
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the SEC has indicated that a less restrictive interpretation would be desir-
able.27 Nevertheless, courts refused to abandon Birnbaum until 1973 when
the Seventh Circuit decided Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.2 8 In
Eason the plaintiffs were shareholders of a corporation which issued 7,000
shares of its stock to purchase the assets of a car dealership. The corpora-
tion assumed the liabilities of the dealership which included notes payable
to GMAC, and GMAC required the corporation personally to guarantee pay-
ment of the dealership's obligations. The business failed, and the corpora-
tion defaulted on the notes. GMAC brought suit in state court to recover
on the guarantees and plaintiffs countered in federal court, alleging misrepre-
sentation of material facts inducing the sale of the dealership in exchange
for the corporation's securities. The court refused to apply the Birnbaum
rule to disallow the plaintiffs' suit and held that the purchaser-seller limita-
tion "is not part of the law of this circuit."'29  Instead, "in each case the plain-
tiff will have to demonstrate membership in the 'special class' protected by
Rule lOb-5 and injury as a direct consequence of the alleged violation."130
II. AFFIRMATION OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER LIMITATION
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores the Supreme Court affirmed
the Birnbaum doctrine and held that plaintiffs were not entitled to sue for
a violation of rule lob-5 since they neither purchased nor sold securities. 3 '
The court based its decision upon five major grounds: (1) the longstanding
judicial acceptance of the doctrine, coupled with Congress' failure to reject
this interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5; (2) the fact that when
Congress wished to provide statutory remedies to persons other than pur-
chasers and sellers it did so expressly; (3) a fear that vexatious litigation
would arise if the doctrine were not followed; (4) the fact that plaintiffs
derived no contractual rights under the consent decree and, therefore,
occupied the same position as any other disappointed offeree of stock; and
(5) the Court's belief that a case-by-case analysis of standing would be an
unsatisfactory basis for establishing liability for conduct in business trans-
actions.
The Court first analyzed the legislative history underlying section 10(b)
and rule lob-5. The majority opinion agreed with the Birnbaum court that
since both section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 proscribed only fraud "in connec-
the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise
of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968);
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 AiA. L. REV. 543 (1971);
Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under
Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO. L.J. 1177 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
28. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See Com-
ment, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement under 10b-5,
6 LOYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 230 (1975).
29. Id. at 661.
30. Id. at 660.
31. The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell, Stewart, and Marshall. A separate concurring opinion by
Justice Powell was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. A dissenting opinion was
filed by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
1975]
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tion with the purchase or sale" of securities, and since the history of section
10(b) revealed no congressional intent to extend a private remedy for money
damages to persons other than defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities,
in contrast to the express civil remedy provided by section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, Congress intended to limit the plaintiff class in a rule lOb-5 action to
actual purchasers and sellers of securities.3 2
As a further ground for its decision, the Court looked to other sections of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts which, in the Court's estimation, led to the conclu-
sion that the remedy provided by section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 was available
only to purchasers and sellers. For example, section 28(a)3 3 of the 1934
Act limits recovery in a private damage action to "actual damages," and a
plaintiff who is neither a purchaser nor a seller is likely to be seeking a
"largely conjectural and speculative recovery. '3 4  Also the Court observed
that those sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which expressly provide for
a private civil remedy 35 limit the plaintiff class to purchasers and sellers.3 6
Another important factor in the majority's opinion was the belief that the
elimination of the purchaser-seller restriction would result in vexatious litiga-
tion by expanding the class of plaintiffs. The Court first observed that the
settlement value to the plaintiff of a "strike suit" would likely outweigh the
chance for success at trial.3 7  However, by applying the Birnbaum rule, a
spurious claim can be eliminated on a motion to dismiss or a motion for sum-
mary judgment if the complaint fails to allege the purchase or sale of a
security. The Court also noted that if the purchaser-seller limitation were
abolished, the trier of fact would be forced to depend largely upon oral testi-
mony to determine difficult issues of fact. A proposal to remedy this prob-
lem was made by the SEC which suggested that in particular cases additional
corroboration of testimony could be required. The Court rejected this propo-
sition stating that the very necessity of fashioning supplemental rules of
corroboration exemplified the need for retaining the purchaser-seller limita-
tion.38
Next, the Court considered the question of whether the status of plaintiffs
as offerees of the consent decree placed them in the type of contractual rela-
tionship for which section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 provide a remedy.3 9 The
32. 95 S. Ct. at 1923, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 547.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970).
34. 95 S. Ct. at 1925, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
35. The sections discussed are: Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1970); Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r (1970).
36. 95 S. Ct. at 1925, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
37. See 492 F.2d 136, 147 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974), where Judge Hufstedler in her dis-
senting opinion in the court of appeals remarked concerning the settlement value of
strike suits: "[A]Ithough they are difficult to prove at trial, they are even more difficult
to dispose of before trial."
38. 95 S. Ct. at 1930, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 554.
39. The court of appeals decision conceded that members of the plaintiff class could
not have enforced the consent decree, but emphasized that plaintiffs were not claiming
a breach of duty imposed by the consent decree but instead were claiming a violation
of statutory antifraud provisions. 492 F.2d 136, 142 n.14 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
of appeals was of the opinion that the consent decree served the "same function" as a
contractual relationship in that it provided a reasonable circumscription of defendant's
[Vol. 29
Court emphasized that only parties to a consent decree may enforce it, and
in this case, members of the plaintiff class were merely intended beneficiaries.
Therefore, the plaintiff class was in no better position than any other offeree
of stock who fails to purchase because of a pessimistic prospectus and later
learns he has missed a valuable opportunity. 40 The Court felt that this
outcome was consistent with congressional intent concerning limitation of
defendants' liability for statements made or omitted in a prospectus in a
registered offering. 41
Finally, the Court rejected the notion of a case-by-case analysis in order
to decide if the particular plaintiffs were sufficiently discrete to justify an
exception to the purchaser-seller rule. The Court considered this variable,
fact-oriented disposition of claims inadequate and instead found the consis-
tent application of the purchaser-seller rule a satisfactory basis for determina-
tion of liability in business transactions.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun criticizes the majority opinion
for reliance upon legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which
admittedly is inconclusive, acceptance as precedent of lower court decisions
never before examined by the Supreme Court, and resort to policy considera-
tions to distinguish the meritorius rule lOb-5 claim for the meretricious one.42
The dissent found it inconceivable that Congress intended the broadranging
provisions of section 10(b) to be limited by a mechanical rule such as the
Birnbaum doctrine. According to the dissent, the question in section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 cases is whether fraud was employed by "any person . ..
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'43  Therefore, the
essential test of a valid rule 10b-5 case is the showing of a "logical nexus
between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase of a security."'44
In analyzing the first major ground relied on by the majority opinion, it
appears that the logic of the Court is unsound if it is accepting the purchaser-
seller limitation because congressional intent did not show that the purpose
of section 10(b) was to extend a remedy to persons other than defrauded
purchasers or sellers of securities. Admittedly there is little evidence of con-
gressional intent as to the purpose of section 10(b), but the evidence which
is available indicates that it was intended to be expansive. 45 However, jus-
tification for the Court's acceptance of the Birnbaum doctrine might lie in
the fact that Congress, well aware of the restrictive judicial interpretation of
section 10(b), had failed to amend its language to provide an express private
civil remedy for those who are thwarted in their attempts to purchase or sell
securities. It is interesting to note that section 10(b) grants the SEC power
to prescribe rules and regulations "necessary or appropriate in the public
potential liability. Id. at 142. The dissent in the court of appeals observed that the
consent decree did not serve the "same function" as a binding contract in that it rendered
plaintiffs far less able to prove causation and damages. Id. at 144.
40. 95 S. Ct. at 1933, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 559-60.
41. Id. at 1933, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 559.
42. Id. at 1937-38, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 564.
43. Id. at 1940, 44 L Ed. 2d at 567.
44. Id. at 1942, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 569.
45. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SacuirrEs LAw: FaAtu, § 2.2, at 22.4 (1974).
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interest or for the protection of investors."146 Professor Loss notes that under
this clause the Commission presumably could adopt rules to protect the
defrauded non-purchaser and non-seller. 47
After reviewing sections 11(a) and 12 of the 1933 Act and sections 9 and
18 of the 1934 Act4s which provide express remedies for their violation, the
Court concluded that Congress could not have intended that the implied
remedy for the violation of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 should be more
expansive than that of these sections. 49 'But if consideration is given to the
language of these sections compared with that of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, it is apparent that their relative scopes are different. The availability
of a cause of action provided by section 11(a) of the 1933 Act is limited
to "any person acquiring the security," while section 12 grants a remedy to
the "person purchasing the said security."50 Section 9 of the 1934 Act, which
prohibits various manipulative devices, limits its remedy to "any person who
shall purchase or sell any security" in a transaction affected by a violation
of the provision, while section 18, which prohibits false statements in securi-
ties transactions, limits the remedy for its violation to "any person . . . who
. . . shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected
by such statement . . . ."1 In contrast, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 prohibit
fraud by "any person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' 52 The remedy is not expressly limited to purchasers or sellers as
in the above sections, but is limited to those persons defrauded in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
At first glance the purchaser-seller limitation may appear to be a practical
approach to the problem of restricting the plaintiff class to prevent vexatious
litigation. However, a more thorough analysis reveals that this approach is
largely a distortion of principles. Indeed -the purchaser-seller limitation will
reduce the number of spurious lawsuits, but it will also eliminate a large num-
ber of legitimate claims for damages. 53  As the dissent points out: "We
should be wary about heeding the seductive call of expediency and about sub-
stituting convenience and ease of processing for the more difficult task of
separating the genuine claim from the unfounded one."15 4 The majority's
answer seems to be that the private cause of action implied by the judiciary
should be judicially delimited until Congress addresses the question. 5
111. CONCLUSION
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores the Supreme Court confirmed
46. See note 4 supra.
47. 3 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1469 n.87.
48. 95 S. Ct. at 1925, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
49. id. at 1925-26, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 549-50.
50. Securities Act of 1933, § II(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); Securities Act of 1933,
§ 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
51. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
52. See note 5 supra.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 1927 n.9, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 551 n.9, where the majority states that
this disadvantage of the Birnbaum rule is "attenuated to the extent that remedies are
available to non-purchasers and non-sellers under state law."
54. Id. at 1941-42, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 569.
55. Id. at 1931-32, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 557.
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the validity of the Birnbaum doctrine limiting the plaintiff class in a section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 case to purchasers or sellers of securities. Although
the Court's opinion contains some errors in logic, its ultimate decision uphold-
ing the purchaser-seller rule most likely will not substantially affect the deci-
sions of the lower federal courts which have been applying the rule liberally
for over twenty years. It is likely that the net result of this decision upon
the courts will amount to no more than a caution against a too liberal inter-
pretation of the purchaser-seller rule such as that of the court of appeals in
Blue Chip Stamps. At most, the decision may spark attempts by -the SEC
or Congress to provide an express remedy for non-purchasers and non-sellers
defrauded in securities transactions.
T. S. Baumgardner
Incorporation for the Purpose of Borrowing
at an Otherwise Usurious Rate of Interest:
Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co.
Justice Mortgage Investors loaned the Flan Corporation $600,000 to
purchase land. The corporation executed a promissory note secured by deed
of trust to Justice Mortgage Investors. To further secure the note, defendants
Clyde and Helen Skeen, for a consideration of $25,000, executed a guaranty
in favor of the lender. After the note and guaranty were assigned to plain-
tiff Glenn Justice Mortgage Company, the mortgaged property was foreclosed
upon and sold for $450,000. Plaintiff sued the guarantors for the $150,000
deficiency owed on the note and the trial court sustained plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. On appeal the defendants contended that a fact
issue was presented by an affidavit which stated that the Flan Corporation
was formed at the lender's insistence for the sole purpose of evading Texas
usury laws.' Therefore, it was argued, the corporation should be disregarded
and the loan should be considered usurious. 2 Held, reversed and remanded
on other grounds: Incorporation for the sole purpose of circumventing Texas
usury laws does not render a loan transaction usurious. Skeen v. Glenn Jus-
tice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Usury is not of common law heritage3 but is wholly the creature of legis-
1. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, and TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01
to .06 (1967) (the Texas usury provisions); id. art. 1302-2.09 (1974) (The Texas corpo-
rate exception statute).
2. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1967) provides that except as other-
wise provided by law no rate of interest shall be charged in excess of 10% per annum.
Under the corporate exception corporations may be charged up to 1 Y% per month or
18% per annum. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (1974).
3. See generally J. WEBB, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF UsuRy §§ 1-12 (1899).
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lation. 4 Derived from Mosaic law and the Christian Medieval tradition, the
law of usury is founded upon the moral and religious view that it is wrong
to charge another for the use of one's money.5 The growth of industrial
economies and the concomitant necessity for more credit and a freer flow of
money led to a gradual relaxation of the moral restraints against the lending
of money. Yet the law of usury has survived, supported in large measure
by a public policy concern for the unsophisticated borrower.6
Although during Reconstruction the Texas Legislature experimented
unsuccessfully with allowing unlimited interest,7 today usury is prohibited by
the Texas Constitution s and statutes, 9 which impose severe penalties on viola-
tors. 10 The popularity of usury laws, which seem to afford protection to the
borrower, makes it unlikely that such laws will be eliminated in the near
future. However, in a money market in which the usury threshold is often
lower than the prime rate of interest, it is expected that more and more
borrowers will seek exceptions to the usury laws in order to obtain credit.1 '
I1. THE CORPORATE EXCEPTION
The public policy argument which underlies usury laws for individuals
does not apply to corporations. 12 The corporate exception evolved from the
policy judgment of legislators that the corporate borrower did not need the
same protection afforded the consumer.' 3 A corporation generally has more
bargaining power, its shareholders have no personal liability, and it seldom
borrows for the necessities of life. In short, the assumption is that corpora-
tions "expecting high risks and high returns should be familiar with financial
arrangements and money's worth.' 4
4. Missouri K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U.S. 351, 355 (1899).
5. See generally S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 82-88 (1963); Com-
ment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J.
748 (1975).
6. See generally Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporation Creates Usury and Tax
Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974); Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash. 2d 268, 273, 407 P.2d
434, 437 (1965), where the Washington Supreme Court expressed the view that usury
statutes are "designed to protect those who by adversity and necessity are driven to bor-
row money at any cost. The protection granted is based on the fact that many borrow-
ers are powerless to resist the avarice of money lenders."
7. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 44 (1869). See also Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past
to Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 235(1968).
8. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
9. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to .06 (1967).
10. Id. art. 5069-1.06 (one who contracts for, charges, or receives a greater rate of
interest than that allowed by law shall forfeit twice the amount of interest; if the inter-
est is more than twice the allowable rate, all principal is forfeited as well, and a misde-
meanor fine of $1,000 may be imposed). For one court's application of these penalty
provisions see Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
11. See generally Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine, 19 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 819 (1968).
12. See Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 233, 131 A. 332, 342(1926), in which the court stated that a corporation "is organized for commercial or
other purposes which are best subserved by the advantages given through the corporate
powers conferred by the state of which it is a creature. It has no sensations, and cannot
be coerced by its necessities into any legal obligations beyond its defined and limited
corporate powers."
13. See Katz, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REV. 51, 55
(1963).
14. Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wash. 584, 478 P.2d 232,
236 (1970).
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The first American experience with statutes excepting corporations from
the usury defense was the New York General Business Law statute of 1850,15
passed in response to a case in which an experienced borrower, a bank,
abused the usury defense to avoid payment of a sizeable debt.' While New
York courts at first gave the corporate exception a literal and unyielding
application, 17 later interpretations were more flexible and looked more to the
circumstances of each transaction. If it appeared on close examination that
in reality no money was loaned to the corporation, but was instead loaned
to an individual, the usury defense was available. The corporate form would
then be disregarded and the lender subjected to the penalties for usury.' 8
The New York trend was reversed in the 1930 case of Jenkins v.
Moyse.19 The borrower, told that he would have to incorporate to obtain
a loan, later sought to have an accompanying mortgage nullified on grounds
that the loan was usurious. The trial court found that the corporate form
was used for concealment of usurious practices and invalidated the loan. The
court of appeals reversed, stating that because the law had been followed
meticulously, the otherwise usurious loans were valid, even though incorpora-
tion had been at the request of the lender. 20 The New York rule has been
expressly followed or given great weight in a number of other jurisdictions.2 '
Some states, however, employ a more flexible interpretation of the
corporate exception and will scrutinize the facts surrounding the transaction
to decide whether or not a corporate shell was used to conceal a usurious
loan to an individual. These question-of-fact jurisdictions tend to favor the
unwary borrower and to ignore the corporate form. For example, in Gelber
v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc.2 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that where a
lender told a borrower, "if you don't incorporate, we will not loan you
money," 23 a jury could decide whether or not the subsequently formed cor-
poration was a device to evade the usury statute. This rule has been applied
to a case of overreaching, 24 and to a case in which the lender was aware
that the loan was not for a true business purpose. 25  Still, the standard in
15. Act of 1850, ch. 172, §§ 1, 2, as amended, N.Y. Gaw. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (Mc-
Kinney 1964).
16. Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
17. See, e.g., Southern Life Ins. v. Packer, 17 N.Y. 51 (1858).
18. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. American Near East & Black Sea Line, Inc., 119
Misc. 650, 197 N.Y.S. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Granniss v. Stevens, 216 N.Y. 583, 111 N.E.
263 (1916).
19. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
20. Id. at 321, 172 N.E. at 522.
21. See, e.g., Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956); Rabinowich v. Eliasberg,
159 Md. 655, 152 A. 437 (1930); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 110
N.W.2d 484 (1961); Country Motors v. Friendly Fin. Corp., 13 Wis. 2d 473, 481, 109
N.W.2d 137, 140 (1961).
22. 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952).
23. Id. at 657.
24. In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956). An attorney here advised
an inexperienced borrower to incorporate and then procured for her a loan of $2,852.95.
A bonus of $1,000 was charged and legal fees were $647.05. To give New Jersey usury
laws a "sympathetic sweep," the corporate form was disregarded. The procurer of the
loan was suspended from practicing law for one year. See note 27 infra.
25. Lesser v. Strubbe, 56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 67 N.J. Super. 537, 171 A.2d 114 (App. Div. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 39 N.J.
90, 187 A.2d 705 (1963).
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Gelber is uncertain, and it is unclear exactly how far the courts will go in
allowing an examination of the circumstances surrounding the loan. 2 6
Indeed, in some New Jersey cases it seems that, even without "piercing the
corporate veil," courts have nullified or modified loans because of uncon-
scionability or deceptive lending practices. 27
Although New Jersey has not set out hard and fast guidelines to determine
if its usury laws have been evaded, some general factors for jury considera-
tion have evolved. The voluntariness of incorporation, the adequacy of the
corporation's financial basis, the purpose of the loan, and -the experience of
the borrower are all relevant in determining if the loan was actually made
to an individual.28  Other states following the New Jersey question-of-fact
approach to the corporate exception have similarly failed to set forth rules
as to which facts are controlling, but rather proceed on a case-by-case basis
in determining if the usury law has been evaded. 29
The main difficulty in question-of-fact jurisdictions is achievement of con-
sistent results. Some courts, though refusing to establish rules as to which
fact patterns will trigger application of the usury laws to corporate loans,
nevertheless seem to rely heavily on the business experience of the borrower
as an indication of whether the transaction was at arm's length.30 The dif-
ference among question-of-fact jurisdictions is apparently rooted in the extent
to which each subscribes to the public policy argument against usury or favors




III. SKEEN V. GLENN JUSTICE MORTGAGE Co.
In Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. the Dallas court of civil appeals
26. In Gelber Justice Brennan stated the rule that: "It is generally recognized that
an individual may recover usurious payments on loans made in fact to the individual
though in form disguised as loans to a corporation and evidenced by obligations executed
by it to hide the fact that the lender has exacted an illegal rate of interest from the
real borrower." Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654, 656 (1956).
Ironically, Brennan cited as authority for this generally recognized principle a number
of cases which had been overruled by Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521
(1930).
27. See, e.g., In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1959), in which an attor-
ney failed to apprise an unsophisticated borrower of the fact that he also represented
the lender. See also Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 579, 179
A.2d 49, 53 (1962); Feller v. Architects Display Bldgs., Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 205, 148
A.2d 634, 639 (App. Div. 1959) ("It is the general rule in the case of the corporate
borrower that it is not illegal to provide for a higher rate of interest than the legal rate
after maturity, but if such rate is unconscionable it will be unenforceable because it
amounts to a penalty.").
28. See Note, Stemming Abuses of Corporate Exemptions from the Usury Laws: A
Legislative and Judicial Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REV. 91, 105 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Securities Inv. Co. v. Indian Waters Dev. Corp., 501 F.2d 662, 665
(5th Cir. 1974); Atlas Subsidiaries of Florida, Inc. v. 0. & 0. Inc., 166 So. 2d 458 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Walnut Discount Co. v. Weiss, 205 Pa. Super. 161, 208 A.2d 26
(1965).
30. See, e.g., Monmouth Capital Corp. v. Holmdel Village Shops, Inc., 92 N.J.
Super. 480, 224 A.2d 35 (1966), where the court denied the defense of usury to a newly-
formed corporation. The court expressed the view that the lender's policy of dealing
only with corporations was legitimate, and, in finding that the corporation was not a
cloak, cited the facts that the incorporated borrower had a bank account, adopted cor-
porate resolutions with respect to other borrowers, paid real estate taxes, entered into
leases with tenants, and was represented by competent counsel.
31. Id. at 39.
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was faced with deciding whether a court should look beneath the surface of
an apparently lawful loan to a corporation with the possibility of finding a
usurious loan to an individual. An affidavit presented by the defendant
stated that the borrower, Flan Corporation, was formed at the insistence of
the lender for the sole purpose of evading the usury statute. No evidence
was presented as to the purpose of the loan. The court held that because
"no facts, or even conclusions '32 had been established which would indicate
that the corporation had been formed as a cloak or cover for a fraudulent
or illegal transaction, 33 the corporate form could not be disregarded and the
loan would have to be treated as lawful.
,By its holding, the court of civil appeals appears to have fallen in line with
the New York rile which stresses formalistic adherence to the corporate
exception. Quoting Jenkins v. Moyse, 34 the court held that "the law has
not been evaded but has been followed meticulously in order to accomplish
a result which all parties desired and which the law does not forbid."3 5  In
a narrower sense, the opinion in Skeen only speaks to the situation in which
the lender makes incorporation a requirement for a commercial loan. The
court in dictum appears to have left open the possibility that if sufficient facts
establishing "fraud or some other transaction tainted with illegality" had been
shown, the corporate entity would have been disregarded.3 6  This dictum is
disturbing because it seems to follow a line of Texas cases which have held
that courts would look beneath the surface of a contract and "if from all the
facts its essence is found to be the receiving or contracting for a greater rate
of interest than is allowed by law, the statutory consequences must be visited
upon it."37  In the past Texas courts have also held that a contract valid on
its face could not be used to avoid the usury laws,3 8 and have pierced the
corporate veil where a corporation appeared to have no real separate
existence from its shareholders.3 9 The Skeen decision is not, however, incon-
sistent with the New York rule. In 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconesky,40 where
32. Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, no writ).
33. Id.
34. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930).
35. 526 S.W.2d at 256.
36. The court in Skeen points out that with a showing of fraud or illegality, the
corporate entity could be disregarded. However, they state that "such is not the situa-
tion in this instance," leaving it unclear what additional facts would be sufficient to
make such a showing. Id. at 256. As this statement is unnecessary to the instant case,
it constitutes dictum.
37. Pickrell v. Alpha Pipe & Steel, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Independent Lumber Co. v. Gulf State Bank, 299 S.W.
939, 942 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1927, writ ref'd).
38. Commercial Sec. Co. v. Rea, 78 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1934), aff'd, 130 Tex, 11, 105 S.W.2d 872 (1937).
39. First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 119-20, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (1939).
40. 37 Misc. 2d 745, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 593,
240 N.Y.2d 956 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 676, 198 N.E.2d 907 (1964). The supreme
court followed Jenkins v. Moyse, quoting that "the test of whether this loan is usurious
is whether it was in fact made to the plaintiff. Doubtless at times loans are made in
fact to an individual though in form they are made to a corporation to hide the fact
that the lender has exacted an illegal rate of interest from the real borrower." Jenkins
v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 324, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930). The court went on to distin-
guish its fact situation from that in Jenkins. Here a loan was made for the purchase
of a one.family residence and the lender knew of the purpose. Also, the court could
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an individual incorporated in order to borrow for the purchase of a one-family
residence, the New York Court of Appeals disregarded the corporate excep-
tion to give effect to its usury law.
For reasons of public policy, if the purpose of a corporate loan were known
-to be personal and necessitous, it is not unlikely that Texas courts would
ignore the corporate form and find usury. Skeen does not encompass every
situation in which a borrower is faced with an incorporation prerequisite. If
the borrower has been wronged, he must establish fraud or illegality in order
to avoid the transaction. 41  Skeen may be criticized because, with the
accessibility of incorporation, a deception might be worked against an
inexperienced borrower. A closer reading, however, should reveal that judi-
cial discretion has not been pre-empted and that the unwary borrower is not
without protection. Incorporation as a lender's requirement for a loan is
tacitly approved. 42
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Skeen is sound on two counts. First, it is easy to apply
and should render more consistent results. This should in turn give lenders
the security of knowing what treatment the courts will give to incorporation
loan requirements. Secondly, it does not leave the incorporating borrower
without any protection but avoids the effect of otherwise taking individuals
out of the credit market when prevalent interest rates are high.
The impact of Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. should be clearer after
Texas courts have the opportunity to decide a case in which an individual
is obliged to incorporate in order to borrow money for personal needs. Per-
haps in this situation it will be found that the usury law has been illegally
evaded. It should not be necessary that Texas apply the corporate excep-
tion in an unyielding manner, only that it modify the rule to fulfill the policy
goals of both the usury provisions and the corporate exception.
Michael R. Boulden
have rested its decision on the 1955 amendment to the New York corporate exception
law, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-521 (McKinney 1964), denying application of the cor-
porate exception to a corporation, "the principal asset of which shall be the ownership
of a one- or two-family dwelling."
41. See note 27 supra.
42. The Skeen decision, like that in Jenkins v. Moyse, suggests an element of estop-
pel in the court's reasoning. If the lender relied on the borrower's false representation
that the loan was being received by a corporation, and that the corporation was a sepa-
rate entity from its shareholders, justice might be furthered by disallowing the defense
of usury. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1973). In the public pol-
icy context of usury, however, estoppel is not well applied. See Texas Trinity Fire Ins.
Co. v. Kerrville Hotel Co., 129 Tex. 310, 323, 103 SW.2d 121, 127 (1937), where the
court said that to give the lender the benefit of estoppel would be to "circumvent the
public policy of the State" as expressed in its usury laws. However, the court applied
estoppel where, after the consummation of the transaction, the borrower acted in a man-




Discriminating Against Nonresidents Not Cured by
Existing Tax Provisions of Neighboring States-
Austin v. New Hampshire
Appellants were residents of Maine who worked in New Hampshire during
the 1970 tax year. New Hampshire imposed upon nonresidents a tax of four
percent on New Hampshire-derived income in excess of $2,000,1 with the
proviso that if the nonresident's home state would have imposed a lesser tax
had the income been earned in that state, the New Hampshire tax would
accordingly be reduced by that amount. New Hampshire imposed no tax
on residents' incomes regardless of where earned. Appellants petitioned the
New Hampshire Superior Court for a declaration that the tax violated the
privileges and immunities clauses of the constitutions of New Hampshire and
of the United States. The cause was transferred directly to the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court, which upheld the tax, and the nonresidents appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.2  Held, reversed: Under the rule re-
quiring substantial equality of treatment for the citizens of the taxing state
and nonresident taxpayers, the New Hampshire Commuters Income Tax vio-
lates the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution, since it falls exclusively on nonresidents' incomes
and is not offset even approximately by other taxes imposed upon residents
alone. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "The Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citi-
zens in the several States."'3  The progenitor of this clause was the fourth
of the Articles of Confederation 4 which attempted to create a free trade area
among the states and to reconcile the authority of the national government
with the sovereignty of the states.
1. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-B: 211 (1970).
2. Austin v. New Hampshire, 419 U.S. 822 (1974) (noting probable jurisdiction).
3. This clause is often referred to as the "interstate privileges and immunities
clause" to distinguish it from the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which prohibits states from abridging the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); P.
KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 691 (4th ed. 1972).
4. The fourth of the Articles of Confederation reads:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabi-
tants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice
excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all
the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, imposi-
tions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively ....
See 3 M. FARRAND, REcoRas OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 112 (rev. ed. 1937) for
Charles Pinckney's assurance to the Convention that the version now found in article IV,§ 2 "is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confedera-
tion ...." Pinckney drafted the present version of the privileges and immunities clause.
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The privileges and immunities clause was initially interpreted to include
those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental and
inherent in all free governments. 5 This interpretation was later narrowed in
Paul v. Virginia,6 where the privileges and immunities possessed by a citizen
of one state sojourning in a second state were restricted to those rights which
the second state afforded its citizens. This is the view commonly accepted
by the courts today.7 Rights to Jerae naturae are not considered among the
privileges and immunities guaranteed to nonresidents. 8 Article IV does not
guarantee to nonresidents the political privileges of state citizenship, such as
voting or holding public officeY Nor is complete procedural equality guaran-
teed.10
5. The classical exposition of the scope of the privileges and immunities clause is
contained in Circuit Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
551 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). Justice Washington noted that the clause
comprehended protection by the government, enjoyment of life and liberty, the right to
acquire and possess property, and the right to pursue happiness and safety. Nonresidents
had the right to pass through or reside in any state, to avail themselves of the state courts
and the writ of habeas corpus, to hold real or personal property, and to be exempt from
higher taxes than were paid by residents of the state.
6. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) (upholding a Virginia statute requiring as a
condition of doing business that a foreign insurance company deposit with the state
treasurer thirty to fifty thousand dollars).
7. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60 (1920); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Louisiana
act granting to a corporation the exclusive right for twenty-five years to maintain
slaughter houses in certain Louisiana parishes was a proper exercise of the state
police power); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
The restrictive interpretation by Justice Field in Paul v. Virginia is believed by
Professor Antieau to be a perversion of the privileges and immunities clause. Antieau
argues that Field himself soon saw the error of his ways and reverted to the fundamental
interpretation in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases. Antieau, Paul's
Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967). For a more general discussion of article
IV, section 2 by the same author see 1 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§
9.13-.22 (1969).
8. The natural resources of a state are deemed to be held in trust by the state for
the benefit of its inhabitants, whose common property the resources are. McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (upholding the power of a state to limit to its own citizens
the right to plant oysters in public waters). See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No.
3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (New Jersey statute forbidding nonresidents to gather
oysters upheld). But the Court has held that this reasoning may not be extended to
permit a state to impose a discriminatory license tax on nonresidents engaged in the
business of fishing for shrimp in the marginal sea since this business is regarded as a
common calling protected under the privileges and immunities clause. Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948). For more thorough discussion of rights to ferae naturae see E.
BARRETT, JR., P. BRUTON, & J. HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398-400 (3d ed. 1968).
See also Note, The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause o the Federal Constitution,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 347 (1928).
9. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898), in which Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking
for the Court, said that a state need not accord a nonresident every privilege that it gives
to its own citizens, so long as such denial does not in essence reduce the nonresident to a
condition of alienage with respect to that state. See generally C. ANTIEAU, COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160-63 (1960).
10. The states may impose some discrimination against nonresidents in access to
state courts as long as the terms of access are reasonable. See, e.g., Douglas v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (actions by nonresidents against foreign
corporations doing business in the state are subject to dismissal at discretion of the
Court); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (invalidating an Arkansas law
which revoked the license of a foreign corporation doing only domestic business within
the state when the corporation resorted to the federal court of the state); Canadian N.
Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) (upholding a Minnesota law that barred a nonresi-
dent from maintaining suit in Minnesota when the cause of action had arisen outside the




It is well settled that one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to
nonresidents is that of doing business on terms of substantial equality with
residents." However, the term "citizens" as used in the clause has been held
not to include corporations1 2 or business trusts." Therefore, since a state
may refuse to admit a foreign corporation to do business in the state, it may
also impose conditions on the privilege of doing business so long as the condi-
tions themselves are not unconstitutional.' 4
Attempts to impose higher taxes on nonresidents have generally been held
unconstitutional.15 Where a business tax operates to deny to a noncitizen
entering a state for the purpose of doing business an equal footing with citi-
zens, the tax has been held invalid.' 6 However, a state may tax income de-
rived by a noncitizen from sources within the state;' 7 and, though nonresi-
dents may not be denied personal exemptions granted to residents," a state
may limit deductions to expenses incurred on business within the state, while
permitting residents to deduct all losses regardless of where they were in-
curred.' 9 Where different methods of taxing residents and nonresidents re-
11. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1920); Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W.R.
R., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). For a
discussion of developments in the related area of state taxation of interstate travel see
Note, State Taxation of Interstate Travel: Alternative Constitutional Limitations, 5 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 167 (1970).
12. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) (corporations are not citizens
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause; thus, they must depend upon
the assent of the states for enforcement of their contracts).
13. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928), which held that a Massachu-
setts trust or common law trust, as in the case of a corporation, cannot claim for itself
the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the associates as individuals by article IV,§ 2.
14. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). The Court held invalid a Tennessee
statute which permitted foreign mining and manufacturing corporations to do business
within the state but gave priority in the distribution of assets to resident creditors.
Harlan, J., speaking for the Court, said that a state may not "when establishing
regulations for the conduct of private business . . . give its own citizens essential
privileges connected with that business which it denies to citizens of different States." Id.
at 252. Cf. La Fourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919), upholding a South Carolina
statute allowing only two-year residents to be licensed insurance brokers. This indicates
that a state statute discriminating in favor of residents against nonresidents will be
upheld where citizens of the enacting state who reside outside its boundaries are included
in the class discriminated against.
15. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 US. 415 (1952) (commercial fishing
license); Smith v. Loughman (tax on transfers by will or intestate succession of
nonresidents' property); Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W.R.R., 249 U.S. 522 (1919) (tax
on privilege of doing railroad construction work); Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut,
185 U.S. 364 (1902) (tax on stock); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870)
(trader's license). But cf. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (higher tax on
deposits made in banks outside the state consistent with due process, equal protection,
and privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment).
16. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W.R.R., 249 U.S. 522 (1919) (Tennessee statute
making the amount of annual tax for privilege of doing railroad construction work
depend on whether the person taxed had his chief office in the state); cf. Spector Motor
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which held invalid under the commerce clause a
tax imposed upon interstate trucking for privilege of doing business in state; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) (tax on invested capital both within and
outside Kansas as condition of doing business).
17. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75 (1920); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37, 53-56 (1920); 29 YALEL.J. 799 (1920).
18. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80 (1920); 18 MIcH. L. REV.
547 (1920).
19. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); 18 MicH. L. REV. 547-48 (1920).
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suit in an approximately equal burden upon each class, the tax scheme is
permissible. 20
II. STATE TAXATION UNDER THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
In reviewing state laws dealing with taxation, the Court has generally ac-
corded the states wide latitude, paying deference to the states' sovereign pow-
ers in fiscal matters. 21 Only where the scheme of taxation violates constitu-
tional guarantees 22 or is disruptive of the concept of federalism must the tax
fall. 23
In Travellers Insurance Co. v. Connecticut24 the Court considered a Con-
necticut statute that on its face discriminated against nonresidents in that it
assessed the stock held by nonresidents at market value without allowing any
deduction for taxes paid by the corporation on real estate, while permitting
such a deduction to resident shareholders. The Court, however, took into
account the entire taxing system of the state in deciding whether nonresidents
were unduly burdened. The Court found that nonresidents paid no local
property taxes, while residents paid those taxes at an average rate approx-
imating or exceeding the rate imposed by the state on nonresidents' stock.
Thus, while greater equality of the tax burden might have been achieved,
it was "enough that the State has secured a reasonably fair distribution of
burdens, and that no intentional discrimination has been made against non-
residents." '25
The landmark cases in the area of state income tax are Shaffer v. Carter26
and Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,27 both announced the same
day. Shaffer held that Oklahoma might tax locally derived income of a non-
resident where it also taxed the income, from whatever source, of its own
residents. The fact that Oklahoma permitted residents to deduct from their
gross income losses sustained outside, as well as those sustained within the
state, while nonresidents were allowed to deduct only those expenses occur-
ring within the state, was held not repugnant to article IV, section 2. The
20. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902). See also Travis v. Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 81 (1920).
21. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973). An Illinois
constitutional provision subjecting corporations, but not individuals, to ad valorem taxes
on personalty was held to comport with equal protection requirements. Cf. Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 427 (1870). See also Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915), which upheld under article IV, § 2 a New York provision giving preference to
residents for the purpose of employment on public works.
22. See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 164(1954) (Texas tax on "gathering gas" as applied to an interstate gas pipeline company
invalid under the commerce clause); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233(1936) (holding violative of due process a Louisiana license tax on newspapers with a
circulation of over 20,000 copies per week).
23. See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870), holding void a
Maryland tax that required nonresident traders to pay $300 for a license, as compared to
a fee of from $15 to $150 for resident traders. Mr. Justice Clifford emphasized that the
privileges and immunities clause "plainly . . secures the right of a citizen of one State
...to be exempt from any higher taxes. . . than are imposed by the State upon its own
citizens." Id. at 430.
24. 185 U.S. 364 (1902).
25. ld.at 371.
26. 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
27. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
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Court reasoned that the "practical effect and operation" of the tax was such
that residents were subjected to at least the same burden as nonresidents. 28
In Travis the Court considered a New York income tax law that granted
to a resident a personal exemption for himself and each dependent, but al-
lowed no such exemption to a nonresident. The state comptroller argued
that any disparity on the face of the statute was counterbalanced by a pro-
vision excluding from taxable income of nonresidents any annuities, interest,
or dividends not part of income from a local business or occupation subject
to the tax. The Court rejected this argument, because the provision exclud-
ing annuities, interest, and dividends did not benefit nonresidents to a degree
corresponding to the discrimination against them, and the assumption that
nonresidents received additional income from outside sources equivalent to
the amount of exemptions denied them was deemed "rash." Since there was
no reasonable ground for the diversity in treatment, the Court held that the
New York law abridged the privileges and immunities clause. Also rejected
was the idea that the possibility of retaliatory tax provisions by adjoining
states was palliative of the discrimination against nonresidents. The Court
would review the statute only with respect to its effect in the existing situa-
tion. In any case, retaliation would not cure the constitutional defect of a
discriminatory provision. 29 It was just such retaliation that the founding
fathers had sought to eradicate by adopting the Constitution.30
III. AUSTIN v. NEw HAMPSHIRE
In Austin v. New Hampshire the state contended that the New Hampshire
Commuters Income Tax did not unduly burden nonresidents because their to-
tal tax liability was unchanged once the -tax credit received from their state of
residence (Maine) was taken into account. The Court, however, balked at
applying the reasoning of Travellers Insurance Co. to this set of facts.3 1 New
Hampshire's argument involved reliance on the tax laws of not only the tax-
ing state, as in Travellers Insurance Co., but those of another state as well,
in reaching the asserted substantial equality between residents and non-resi-
dents.
,In Travis the Court had roundly refused to take into account any possible,
but as yet non-existent, tax provisions of adjoining states, characterizing such
provisions as "wholly speculative." While the facts of Travis did not call for
a holding on whether the Court would consider the effect of an existing tax
provision of an adjoining state, language in the case implied that the Court
would not consider such a provision in assessing constitutionality.3 2 Austin
28. The Court also based its decision upon the jurisdictional factor. Since the state'sjurisdiction over nonresidents extended only to property or trade within the state, the
state had no obligation to accord nonresidents a deduction for losses incurred outside the
state. 252 U.S. at 57.
29. 252 U.S. at 82.
30. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Lemmon v. The People, 20
N.Y. 562 (1860).
31. 420 U.S. at 659 n.4, 666.
32. Travis contained dictum stating that the establishment of retaliatory discrimina-
tion would not cure the constitutional defect, thus giving rise to a strong inference that
even an existing provision would not be considered by the Court. 252 U.S. at 82.
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clearly says that the constitutionality of one state's statutes affecting nonresi-
dents cannot depend upon the present configuration of the statutes of another
stateA3
New Hampshire also contended that Maine, the appellant taxpayers' state
of residence, could shield its residents from the New Hampshire tax by
amending its credit provisions. In considering this argument, -the Court fol-
lowed Travis, both in rejecting the contention that retaliation could cure a
statute that would otherwise be constitutionally defective, and in finding that
retaliation was in fact so at odds with the constitutional mandate as to com-
pound, rather than cure, the defect.3 4
On the threshold point of standing, the Court found that even nonresident
taxpayers whose total tax liability was unchanged by the tax had standing
to challenge the New Hampshire statute. Although the withholding require-
ment was not in itself unconstitutional, 3 5 it was sufficient to confer standing
in that it deprived the taxpayer of the use value of the excess withheld over
his ultimate tax liability.3 6
The problem before the Court in Austin was essentially the same one that
had faced the Court in Travis, and the opinion in Austin is in accord with
prior treatment. Austin did extend the rule of Travis to cover the effect of
existing, as well as potential, tax provisions of neighboring states, but the ex-
tension was not sweeping and was clearly foretold in Travis. That the Court
again saw fit to deal with the effect of tax provisions of adjacent states on
the privileges and immunities of nonresidents is indicative of the importance
the Court attached to the matter. The Court's concern for maintaining the
integrity of the federalist concept by avoiding a network of retaliatory state
tax laws that would strangle commerce and discriminate against nonresidents
is manifest in not just the wording, but the very existence, of the opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Austin v. New Hampshire makes clear -that the Court will not consider the
effect of existing tax provisions of neighboring states when reviewing a state
tax statute for conformity with the privileges and immunities clause. Beyond
this extension of Travis, the Court reworked old ground; i.e., the possibility
of retaliation by a neighboring state will not be considered as an ameliorative
factor, and a tax falling exclusively on income of nonresidents must be ap-
proximately offset by other taxes imposed on residents alone. The Court also
reiterated its dedication to the principle that a primary purpose of the priv-
33. 420 U.S. at 668. Nor will the reciprocal nature of the tax statute alter this. Id. at
659 n.4.
34. Id. at 666-67.
35. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920). The withholding
provision does not increase the tax burden of nonresidents. It merely recognizes the fact
that as to them the state imposes no personal liability, and adopts a convenient substitute
for it. Id. at 76; cf. Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
36. 420 U.S. at 659 n.4. The Court found this adequate to establish such a taxpayer
as a party adversely affected by the state's tax laws, thus making him one who has a
"direct stake in the outcome" of the litigation. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972) (Sierra Club denied standing in suit for injunction against a skiing development,
for failure to assert and show irreparable harm to itself or its members).
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ileges and immunities clause is to eliminate barriers to the free flow of com-
merce between the states. These factors would all seem to restrict effectively
any further attempts by a state to tax nonresidents' incomes under circum-
stances where residents' incomes are not taxed, and where the taxes imposed
on the residents alone do not approximately offset the tax on nonresidents.
Furthermore, the giving of standing to even those taxpayers whose ultimate
tax liability is unchanged tends to assure that a state will not be able to bor-
row a nonresident taxpayer's funds interest-free under the guise of the with-
holding process.
Marilyn H. Elam
The Right of Self-Representation in Criminal Proceedings:
Faretta v. California
Anthony Faretta was charged in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
with grand theft. In a preliminary ruling the trial judge granted Faretta's
request to represent himself. After a hearing was conducted to ascertain
defendant's ability to conduct his own defense, the preliminary ruling was
reversed and a public defender was appointed. The judge ruled that defend-
ant's waiver of counsel had not been made knowingly and intelligently and
that defendant did not have a constitutional right to conduct his own defense.
At trial the jury found defendant guilty as charged; the California Court of
Appeals affirmed both trial court rulings and the conviction. The United
State Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Held, reversed: Implied in the
sixth amendment is an independent constitutional right of self-representation
which a defendant in a criminal trial may exercise if his election is voluntary
and intelligent. Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562
(1975).
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE ROLE OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution 2 provides that,
"[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense."'3 Through a series of decisions,
commencing with Powell v. Alabama,4 the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that any criminal defendant, regardless of financial resources, has
an absolute right to representation by counsel in any proceeding which may
result in incarceration.5
1. 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
2. The sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
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An accused may waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se if the court
finds that his waiver is made knowingly and intelligently.6 Whether such
waiver may be asserted as a matter of constitutional right has been an area
of disagreement among the circuit courts of appeals.7
A. The Historical Role of Self-Representation
English common law held self-representation to be the general rule, with
assistance of counsel the exception, 8 while early American legal history evi-
denced a conscious trend toward allowing criminal defendants a choice of
proceeding either pro se or through counsel. 9 Consideration of the rigid
English practice strongly suggests that this trend was directed toward expand-
ing the flexibility of self-representation by allowing the assistance of coun-
sel. 10 Although assistance became more -readily available to the defendant,
it appears that this development was not intended as a limitation on the
availability of self-representation.11 Indeed, many of the colonies included
the right of self-representation within their charters and declarations of rights,
and later, upon achieving statehood, within their constitutions.12
The First Congress directly addressed the issue by establishing the
statutory right to proceed pro se in federal criminal prosecutions through sec-
tion 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.13 It is analytically important, however,
that the sixth amendment, proposed one day after Congress enacted the Judi-
ciary Act, is silent with respect to any right to self-representation, while it af-
firmatively grants the right to assistance of counsel. Arguably, this silence
could indicate either an intent to disallow constitutional protection to the
(1938). For more extensive treatment see W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS, passim (1955) [hereinafter cited as BEANEY]; Jones, Criminal Law
and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 227, 238-43 (1973); Steele,
The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice
and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488 (1969).
A defendant has an absolute right to retain counsel of his choice. Chandler v. Fretag,
348 U.S. 3 (1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). For discussion of
the right to counsel in "critical stages" see, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also Note, Winters v. Cook: Ef-fective Assistance of Counsel and the Waiver Doctrine, 28 Sw. L.J. 805 (1974).
7. See notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
8. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed.
1898).
9. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 453, 499 P.2d 489, 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
236 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973); see BEANEY 14-22; Note, Where Is the
Constitutional Right to Self Representation and Why Is the California Supreme Court
Saying All Those Terrible Things About It?, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV. 196, 199 (1973).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. BEANEY 14-22.
12. For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 provided: "Every
man that findeth himselfe unfit to plead his owne cause in any Court shall have Libertie
to imploy any man against whom the Court doth not except, to helpe him." Similarly,
the Consessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, in 1677, provided "that no person
shall be compelled to fee any attorney or counciller to plead his cause, but that all per-
sons have free liberty to plead his own cause, if he please." Faretta v. California, 95
S. Ct. 2525, 2537 n.37, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 578 n.37 (1975). See also Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
13. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)): "In all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or
by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein."
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right of self-representation,'14 or that the right was considered to be implied
and the inclusion of the right to the assistance of counsel was intended to sup-
plement the other rights granted a criminal defendant.1 5 It is precisely this
omission which has given rise to -the conflict as to whether or not this right
is constitutionally grounded. 16
B. The Status of Prior Authority
'Before Faretta v. California the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of a constitutional right to self-representation only by way of dicta.
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann17 the Court spoke of the right
to assistance of counsel and the "correlative" right to dispense with a lawyer's
aid,' 8 further stating that, "[t]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon
a defendant."' 19 This reference to a "correlative" right has been held to indi-
cate the Court's recognition of the existence of a right to self-representation.20
In other decisions, the Court has referred to this "correlative" right in terms
of the fifth amendment's due process clause, as well as the sixth amendment. 21
Circuit courts of appeals have not been consistent in interpreting and
applying this Supreme Court dicta; although four circuits have held the right
of self-representation to be constitutionally protected, 22 three circuits have
denied such recognition. 2' The primary case supporting the existence of the
constitutional right is United States v. Plattner,24 in which the Second Circuit
held that the right of the accused to manage and conduct his own defense
in a criminal case is implicit in both the fifth and sixth amendments. In
thirty-seven states a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to conduct
his own defense, appear through counsel, or both. 25  Many state decisions
have gone further, holding that the right is founded not only upon their
respective state constitutions, but upon the sixth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution. 26
14. Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).
15. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1964).
16. See notes 22-26 infra and accompanying text.
17. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
18. "The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with
a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the
substance of an accused's position before the law." id. at 277 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 279.
20. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174
(1946).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1970); Lowe
v. United States, 418 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d
1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. See, e.g., Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966); Butler
v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
24. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. For classification of and citations to provisions in the 37 state constitutions, see
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 nn.6-8 (2d Cir. 1964). See also BEANEY
209, 237.
26. See, e.g., Lockhard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 451 P.2d 1014 (1969); People v. Nel-
son, 47 Ill. 2d 570, 268 N.E.2d 2 (1971); Blanton v. State, 229 Ind. 701, 98 N.E.2d
186 (1951); State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164 (1972); State v. Verna, 9
Ore. App. 620, 498 P.2d 793 (1972).
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A defendant's opportunity to manage and conduct his own defense has thus
depended upon the view of the right of self-representation espoused by the
particular jurisdiction in control.27 In addition, the status attributed to the
right necessarily controlled the manner in which it was applied. Where the
right was deemed constitutionally protected, 28 the trial court must have
informed the defendant of his choice between self-representation or represen-
tation by a lawyer29 and advised him why the latter alternative was prefer-
able.3 0  Further, upon election to defend without counsel, a hearing had to
be held to satisfy the court that the defendant was capable of making an in-
telligent choice;3 ' once capability was established, denial of the right of self-
representation required reversal. In federal courts holding the right to
be only statutory in character, 2 notice of the right was not required to be
given by the court,3 3 use of the right was subject to the court's discretion once
the trial had commenced,3 4 and prejudice was required to be shown in order
to reverse a wrongful denial.2 5
In those jurisdictions which have not recognized the right of self-
representation under federal or state law the traditional rules governing
waiver of the right to counsel have applied.3 0 Protection of the accused's con-
27. The positions of the courts in reaching divergent stands upon the issue of a con-
stitutional right to self-representation warrants mention. United States Supreme Court
dictum has declared the right to dispense with counsel to be "correlative" to the right
to the assistance thereof. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942). Further, the Court stated that "the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon
a defendant," and the accused may waive his right to counsel so long as he "knows what
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 279. Decisions advancing
this dictum as evidence of the right's constitutional stature include Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946); Arnold v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 275 (2d Cir. 1964).
It has been held that the right to defend is personal; that although conducting one's
own defense may be detrimental, the choice must be honored out of "that respect for
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-
51 (1970). Moreover, respect for individual autonomy has been held to require a de-
fendant to "go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice
'with eyes open.'" United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, viewing the sixth amendment guarantees as per-
sonal to the accused, reasoned that the right to counsel was intended as a supplementary
aid, not as an impairment of "the absolute and primary right to conduct one's own de-
fense." United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
In United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), the court, after re-
viewing Supreme Court dicta, concluded that the sixth amendment did not "prohibit" the
right of self-representation. Id. at 1019. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, in holding the right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) to be
only statutory in character, noted that, although the Supreme Court had "recognized"
the right in dicta, it had never given it constitutional stature. Brown v. United States,
264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See also Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th
Cir. 1963).
28. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
29. Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1974); see note 13 supra.
33. Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1965).
34. Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963).
35. United States v. Cantor, 217 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Brown
v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
36. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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stitutional right to counsel imposed a duty upon the trial judge to determine
the competency of an attempted waiver of such right.37 Johnson v. Zerbst
established the proposition that a waiver is valid if it is made "knowingly and
intelligently,"38 and acceptance of an ineffective waiver, if challenged,
required reversal.A9 Scrutinization of a waiver of counsel thus invoked a
balancing of the defendant's interest to proceed pro se and society's interest
in achieving justice in the form of a fair trial.
The "power" to waive the right to the assistance of counsel has often been
discussed in terms of the right to self-representation. 40  In People v. Sharp,41
however, the California Supreme Court construed dictum in Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann4 2 as indicative of only a conditional right to waive the
constitutional right to counsel, 43 stating further that the right to waive a con-
stitutional right is not necessarily a right of constitutional dimension,44 relying
for support upon Singer v. United States.4 5
Even where the right to self-representation has been held to be constitu-
tionally grounded, acceptance of the defendant's waiver of counsel and elec-
tion to proceed pro se has been conditional upon a finding that his choice
was knowingly and intelligently made. 46 The power to waive counsel and
the right to self-representation might, therefore, appear to be substantially
equivalent, differentiated only by the fact that, as a constitutional right, the
trial court must inform the defendant of his right to choose, and a wrongful
denial results in reversal. 47
The question of whether there exists a constitutional right to self-represen-
tation has been in need of Supreme Court resolution. The Court recognized
that need in accepting Faretta v. California.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id. at 464:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
39. Id. at 468.
40. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964): "The right to
counsel and the right to defend pro se in criminal cases form a single, inseparable bundle
of rights, two faces of the same coin . . . . The choice between the two [is] some-
times discussed in terms of a waiver of the right to counsel, and sometimes in terms
of an election to have a lawyer or to defend pro se." See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Adams v. United States ex rel. Mc-
Cann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
41. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
944 (1973).
42. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
43. 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
44. Id.
45. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). The Court stated: "The ability to waive a constitutional
right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right."
Id. at 34. In Singer the Court did not address the right to counsel, but rather the right
to waive trial by jury. The difference in the amendment language between the granting
of the right to jury trial and the right to assistance of counsel poses a significant prob-
lem in drawing a direct analogy: "Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . . In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Arnold
v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1969).
47. See notes 31-46 supra and accompanying text.
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II. FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA
In Faretta the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment,48 guarantees a defendant
an independent constitutional right of self-representation in a state criminal
trial.49 The Court noted that although a defendant cannot be convicted and
imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to counsel, it is a quite dif-
ferent thing to say that a state may "force" unwanted counsel upon a defend-
ant. While recognizing that in most criminal prosecutions a better defense
could be presented with a lawyer's assistance, the Court reasoned that the
benefits of legal assistance would be jeopardized where the assistance was
neither desired nor accepted. 50 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, con-
sidered the right to defend to be "personal" to the accused, as it is he who
bears the consequences of a conviction.r 1 The defendant must, therefore,
be free to choose between representation by counsel or defending pro se;
although conducting one's own defense may prove to be detrimental, such
choice is to be honored out of "the respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law." 52
In reaching its conclusion the majority relied heavily upon the structure
of the sixth amendment and the legal history preceding that amendment's
adoption. 53  The amendment was read as granting to the accused the right
to make his defense personally, with the right to have the assistance of coun-
sel as a supplementary aid, when so desired. 54 Thus, an independent -right
of self-representation was said to arise through implication.55  In support of
this conclusion a review of English and early American legal treatment of
the pro se defendant and his gradually developing right to counsel was relied
upon to show that, since self-representation was the general practice when
the sixth amendment was proposed, the framers intended the right to counsel
to be an optional aid to a defendant in the presentation of his defense, rather
than an "organ of the state" forced upon him in derogation of his Tight to
defend himself.56 The Court also cited prior dicta, circuit court decisions,
and the many state constitutional provisions, as evidencing a general con-
sensus that the right is fundamentally integrated within the criminal justice
system. 7
While declaring the right to self-representation to be of constitutional
stature, the Court qualified its use by requiring that the defendant knowingly
48. See note 2 supra.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 2533, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 572-73.
50. Id. at 2533-34, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 573-74.
51. Id. at 2533, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 572-73.
52. Id. at 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 581, citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-
51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2532-40, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 572-80.
54. Id. at 2532-34, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 572-74.
55. Id. at 2534, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 574. Further, the Court distinguished an independ-
ent right from an inferred mechanical right. The right does not arise mechanically from
a defendant's power to waive his right to the assistance of counsel, but rather, is found
independently in the structure and history of the constitutional text. Id. at 2533 n.15,
45 L. Ed. 2d at 572-73 n.15.
56. Id. at 2533, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
57. Id. at 2532-33, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 569-72.
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and intelligently forego the benefits normally attributed to the right to coun-
sel, 58 citing Johnson v. Zerbst59 as controlling authority. This qualification
apparently is based upon an attempt to strike a balance between the constitu-
tional right to counsel with the right to proceed pro se. The Court explained
that in order for the defendant to make a "competent and intelligent" choice,
he must be made aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-represen-
tation."6 0 In this manner, should he decide to defend pro se, the record will
reflect the fact that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open." 61
While granting the right to proceed pro se to all defendants in all courts,
the Court was silent with respect to the procedural ramifications incident to
the exercise of that right. Presumably, consistency with the treatment of
other fundamental rights will require that a defendant be informed of this
right by the court.62 The issues of whether the right may be invoked during
the trial, whether or not a defendant is limited to an "either-or" decision,63
and on what grounds appellate relief will be granted are left for future deter-
mination. Albeit of constitutional stature, the right might be forfeited if con-
sciously abused to disrupt the orderly proceedings of trial.6 4  To the extent
that these issues and others65 remain undetermined, the pro se defendant
travels a precarious road in pursuing his right of self-representation.
Chief Justice Burger dissented, viewing the recognition of a constitutional
right as a perversion of the protection guaranteed by the right to counsel,
and as fundamentally conflicting with fair trial considerations. 66  Further, the
Court's reliance on past dicta and circuit court authority was considered mis-
guided and irrelevant. 67 As indicated above, however, the majority decision
58. Id. at 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82. In using the word "forego" an effort
seems to be made to distinguish this release of right from that of a "waiver." However,
in citing Johnson and Adams as authority and using the quotations in such context, the
implication arises that in "foregoing" the benefits of counsel, a valid waiver of the right
to counsel is effectuated. Taking the Court's treatment of this issue as a whole, it is
suggested that whether one will be adjudged to have "knowingly and intelligently" "fore-
gone" the benefits of counsel will depend upon his being found able "competently and
intelligently" to make such a choice, understanding fully the consequences of his doing
so. This qualification is, in form, that which has been applied in cases dealing with
a "waiver" of the right to counsel. Practically applied then, the standard to be invoked
in determining competency in either case would appear the same.
The Court stated further that the defendant's choice to proceed pro se was a compe-
tent exercise of "informed free will." It is a necessary implication of the Court's cita-
tion of language from the Johnson and Adams cases that a defendant need only be
"aware" of the consequences and be exercising his "informed free will." Once estab-
lished as competent, in terms of awareness, the defendant's informed choice becomes
cloaked with constitutional protection.
59. 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82, citing Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 270 (1942).
61. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
62. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966); United States v. Plattner,
330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
63. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54
MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1181-84 (1970). See also Comment, Self-Representation in
Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1479
(1971).
64. See Grano, note 63 supra, at 1182; Comment, note 63 supra, at 1493. See also
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
65. 95 S. Ct. at 2549-50, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 591-92.
66. Id. at 2542-44, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 583-84.
67. Id. at 2544-45, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 585-86.
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held that the right is not absolute and may be denied where a defendant
is found incompetent to appreciate his choice.6 s As to the competent defend-
ant, his freedom of choice appears to be of primary consideration. Both
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in separate dissents, attacked the
majority's reliance on the history of the right of self-representation as being
inconclusive authority for the implication of such right in the sixth amend-
ment.609 Blackmun further contended that the right stands in diametric
opposition to the interest of the state that justice be achieved in all criminal
trials. 70  Emphasis was placed upon the infinite procedural questions which
the decision creates but leaves unanswered. 71
III. CONCLUSION
In recognizing a constitutional right of self-representation the Supreme
Court leaves much to speculation as to its practical implementation and over-
all effect upon the quality of justice to be achieved in criminal trials where
such right is asserted. While leaving the development of ground rules to
future case law, the Court's decision permits the "competent" defendant to
exercise true freedom of choice in determining the direction his defense will
take. In essence, the Court has established that while the assistance of coun-
sel is usually essential to guarantee the fairness of a criminal proceeding, it
is the accused's fundamental choice whether or not to avail himself of such
protection. Conditioning use of the right upon a defendant's "knowingly and
intelligently" relinquishing the benefits of the right to counsel balances the
interest of the accused in conducting his own defense with the integrity of
the judicial system as a truth-determining process and promotes the ultimate
goal of fairness in the criminal justice system.
James L. Deem
State v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.: Utilities Regulation
in the Public Interest by the Texas Attorney General
On January 30, 1975, defendant Southwestern Bell announced an increase
in its long-distance intrastate telephone rates, effective March 1, 1975.
Within one week the Texas Attorney General sought to enjoin Bell from im-
plementing the announced increase on the ground that it was unreasonably
high.' The district court granted the state's motion for a temporary injunc-
68. See note 65 supra.
69. 95 S. Ct. at 2545-48, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 586-87, 590-91.
70. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Burger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
71. 95 S. Ct. at 2549-50, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 591-92.
1. The announced rate increase was designed to yield an additional $45 million an-
nually in revenue from Southwestern Bell's Texas intrastate operations.
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tion, restraining Bell from implementing any rate increase. The Austin court
of civil appeals dissolved the temporary injunction, holding that the sep-
aration of powers doctrine was violated when the district court, in deter-
mining whether a rate increase was unreasonably high, had determined what
a reasonably high increase would be and had, thereby, exercised a purely
legislative function.2 The state's petition for writ of error to the Texas
Supreme Court was granted. Held, reversed and modified: The attorney
general may sue in the public interest to enjoin an unreasonable rate increase.
In entertaining such suits courts do not exercise a legislative function since
the determination of allegations of unreasonableness is not tantamount to rate
making. The trial court's order was modified to the extent that only the pro-
posed rate increase was prohibited by the injunction. State v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).
1. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Article IV, section 22 of the Texas Constitution and subsequent statutory
law grant the attorney general the power to "represent the State in all suits
and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a
party . . . [and] take such action in the courts as may be proper and neces-
sary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or
demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not
authorized by law."'3 This power has been held exclusive and sufficient to
sustain an action falling within the parameters of the provision.4 The section,
however, presents two major areas of difficulty: (1) its arguable conflict
with article V, section 21 of the state constitution5 which provides that county
and district attorneys shall represent the state in the district and inferior
courts, and (2) its application to corporate regulation.
A. Relative Powers of the Attorney General and
County and District Attorneys
The tension between article IV, section 226 and article V, section 217
2. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 523 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, writ granted), construing TEX. CONST. art. 1I, § 1.
3. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4409 (1966) is
substantially the same.
4. State v. International & G.N. R.R., 89 Tex. 562, 35 S.W. 1067 (1896); State ex
rel. Clement v. Paris Ry., 55 Tex. 76 (1881); Security State Bank v. State, 169 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd); American Liberty Pipe Line Co. v.
Agey, 167 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, no writ).
5. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21 provides: "The County Attorney shall represent the
State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties; but if
any county shall be included in a district in which there shall be a District Attorney,
the respective duties of the District Attorneys and County Attorneys shall in such coun-
ties be regulated by the Legislature."
6. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22, construed in Brady v. Brooks, 99 Tex. 366, 89 S.W.
1052 (1905); Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887); State
v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307 (1882).
7. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21, construed in Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. 261, 285
S.W.2d 191 (1955); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55
(Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4395 (1966).
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results from attempts by Texas courts to balance the respective provisions.
The leading case, Brady v. Brooks,8 concerned a legislative grant of authority
empowering the attorney general to bring actions for the collection of speci-
fied railroad, personal, and corporate income taxes. The authority of the
attorney general was challenged by the county and district attorneys, who
were not joined in the actions, on the ground that the statute was violative
of article V, section 21. 'In making its decision the court was faced with its
prior decision in State v. Moore9 which involved a challenge by the county
attorney of the attorney general's power to sue in accordance with a statute
to collect defaulted bond money. 10 In Moore the county attorneys had pre-
vailed on the theory that article IV, section 22 bestowed only appellate
authority on the attorney general. The Brady court determined that the deci-
sion in Moore on the priority of the county attorney to institute suit was dic-
tum in that the holding was not necessary to the result in the case." The
court further held that the legislature could empower the attorney general
to undertake actions in the lower courts.' 2  Therefore, where the legislature
specifically authorizes suits by the attorney general, such authorization will
ordinarily stand against constitutional challenge premised upon article V,
section 21.
Absent a statute allocating the power to bring suit, courts have held that
the attorney general must bring the suit so long as the nature of the suit is
"important", i.e., where the public interest is involved and the action, if unre-
strained, may harm that interest. 13 It was held by the Texas Supreme Court,
8. 99 Tex. 366, 89 S.W. 1052 (1905).
9. 57 Tex. 307 (1882).
10. 99 Tex. at 374, 89 S.W. at 1054. Subsequent to the filing of suit by the attor-
ney general, the county attorney sought to prosecute the action in lieu of the attorney
general. This motion was granted by the trial court. The county attorney collected thefunds, withheld his alleged statutory commission and remitted the balance to the attor-
ney general. The attorney general then brought suit for the amount of commissions
withheld.
11. Id. at 375, 89 S.W. at 1054. The Brady court argued that since the Moore courtfound that there was no statutory authority permitting the county attorney to withhold
commissions, the decision concerning the construction of art. IV, § 22 need not have
been decided, the former finding being sufficient to return the withheld funds to the at-
torney general. Moreover, the decision on art. IV, § 22 could not stand by itself since,
for the county attorney to prevail, there must exist a statute approving his conduct. The
court also stated that if its analysis on the question of dicta was inaccurate, then it
would decline to follow the precedent established in Moore.
12. Id. at 378, 89 S.W. at 1056. The court held that the structure of the two sec-
tions allowed the legislature to distribute the authority of the attorney general and
county and district attorneys so long as neither office was so deprived of its duties as
to practically destroy the office. The court further looked to the main function of
county attorneys at the time of constitutional enactment and found they were primarily
engaged in criminal prosecutions, intimating, without holding, that art. V, § 21 mightbe applicable solely to district and county attorney authorization in criminal cases. Id.;
see note 67 inf ra.
13. State v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 81 Tex. 530, 17 S.W. 60 (1891); State ex
rel. Clement v. Paris Ry., 55 Tex. 76 (1881); Wexler v. State, 241 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1922, no writ); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048 (Tex. Civ.
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893). In Wexler the court
said: "The distinction between the granting of authority to represent the state in all
cases in the district and inferior courts, and the authority to institute important litigation
in the name of the state, is, we think, clear, and such distinction has been recognized
in the decisions of our appellate courts." 241 S.W. at 233. See also Looscan v. County
of Harris, 58 Tex. 511 (1883); Goar v. City of Rosenberg, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 218, 115
S.W. 653 (1909); Duncan v. State, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 447, 67 S.W. 903 (1902).
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in State ex rel. Clement v. Paris Railway,14 that this distinction between
important litigation in which the state must be involved and less significant
suits applied to the regulation of private corporations. 15 And in City of
Carrollton v. Southwestern States Telephone Co.16 it was specifically held that
a county attorney is not the proper party to challenge intrastate telephone
rate increases.
This conforms with the general rule in most states' 7 and with the analysis
of commentators' 8 that common law powers exist to the extent not superseded
by statute. 19 In Garcia v. Laughlin20 and State ex rel. Downs v. Harney,2 1
the attorney general complained that he had not been joined in actions to
remove public officials. 22 He based his complaint on an assertion that a
removal action was either an action in quo warranto, in which case only the
attorney general would be authorized to bring the action, 23 or, alternatively,
that bringing the action was within the inherent common law powers of his
office.24 The courts rejected these arguments. Since a specific statute dealt
with the removal of officials25 the courts held that they may not enlarge the
powers and duties of the attorney general prescribed by the constitution and
statutes. 26  Further, the quo warranto authority of the attorney general was
denied since quo warranto applies where the officer (or corporation) has for-
feited his office (or charter) and removal of an official is distinct from a for-
feiture. 27 In State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co.28 the attorney general
had consented to a prior judgment beyond the authority prescribed by statute.
While the court cited the above-referenced language -from Harney, Reagan
involved a statutory prohibition against the authority exercised by the attor-
ney general. Where such a prohibition exists, the attorney general presum-
ably would be precluded from asserting inherent common law powers.
14. 55 Tex. 76 (1881).
15. The distinction was originally drawn on the basis of a public nuisance; however,
this doctrine has been expanded to cover the general public interest. See note 39 infra.
16. 381 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See Shepperd, Common Law Powers and Duties of the Attorney General, 7 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 1 (1955) (discussion and citation of authorities in other jurisdictions).
18. Id.; Taylor, Modernizing the Powers of the Attorney General of Texas, 36 TEx.
B.J. 51 (1973).
19. The conceptual basis for the argument is premised on the legislative adoption
of the common law in Texas. [1840] Tex. Laws 3, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAs
177 (1898), now appearing as TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1 (1969). For an excel-
lent discussion see Shepperd, note 17 supra.
20. 155 Tex. 261, 285 S.W.2d 191 (1955).
21. 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
22. See also State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
23. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6253 (1970).
24. State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
25. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5970 (1962).
26. State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.), quoted in Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. at 266, 285
S.W.2d at 194-95. The Harney court also noted that the removal of a sheriff is a
"purely local action" and as such could be distinguished from "important" litigation.
164 S.W.2d at 58; see note 13 supra.
27. State ex rel. Down v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
28. 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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B. Attorney General Powers To Regulate Corporations
Numerous cases have held that the attorney general is charged with the
constitutional duty of forfeiting corporate charters whenever he shall deter-
mine the existence of sufficient cause notwithstanding prior regulation by an
administrative body. 29 Administrative permission is not prerequisite to the
institution of such suits.30 Thus, the need for some degree of independence
is vital to permit the execution by the attorney general of his constitutional
duty.
Ground for fertile debate lies in that portion of article IV, section 22 which
provides that "the Attorney General shall . . . take such action. . . as...
necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or
demanding. . . taxes, tolls, . . . not authorized by law."3' 1 In interpreting
this section, Security State Bank v. State 2 and Western Union Telegraph v.
State33 have held, in general terms, that the attorney general is under a duty
to bring such actions as necessary to preclude the proposed or continued use
of corporate "power . . .not authorized by law."'34 The breadth of these
holdings may be explained on the facts, since, in both cases, the subject cor-
poration had violated a Texas statute and the attorney general was seeking
to enjoin any further unlawful corporate activity in the state. In Western
Union, however, the attorney general sought to go beyond the statutory provi-
sions for penalties and to enjoin all corporate activities. 35 It might, therefore,
be argued that this case presents authority for vesting broad regulatory
powers in the office of the attorney general, at least where the action seeks
to bar corporate activity totally.38
Two early cases dealing with the attorney general's constitutionally
mandated powers support the above interpretation. ,In State v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.3 7 the court found a constitutional duty on the part of the
attorney general to "inquire into the charter rights of all private corpora-
tions"88 when a public injury was to be redressed since the attorney general
could not maintain an action when purely private rights were involved. The
29. Day v. State, 489 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
John L. Hammond Life Ins. Co. v. State, 299 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Teachers Annuity Life Ins. Co., 149 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1941, writ ref'd) (all construing TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22).
30. See, e.g., Day v. State, 489 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Teachers Annuity Life Ins. Co., 149 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1941, writ ref'd). While these cases deal with the attorney general
vis-i-vis the commissioner of insurance, the holdings and analyses appear applicable to
other regulatory agencies in the absence of a specific legislative mandate to the contrary,
i.e., state environmental matters under TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 21.253(c) (1972) and
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.02 (Supp. 1974). See also Security State
Bank v. State, 169 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (regula-
tory power of state banking board).
31. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
32. 169 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
33. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 121 S.W. 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), constru-
ing TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
34. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
35. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 121 S.W. 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
36. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22 requires the attorney general to "especially inquire
into the charter rights of all private corporations .
37. 81 Tex. 530, 17 S.W. 60 (1891).
38. Id. at 547, 17 S.W. at 64, construing Tax. CoNsT. art. IV, § 22.
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case did not involve the rate charged, for that was within the legislative limit,
but rather the validity of certain bonds acquired by the defendant which, if
determined invalid, might permit the bond issuer (a railroad company) to
reduce its rates charged to the public. 39 In upholding the attorney general's
constitutional authority to bring suit, the court suggested that "[t]he right of
the attorney general, in behalf of the state, through the courts, to prevent
any private corporation from exercising any power not conferred by law,
when this is hurtful to the public . . . cannot be questioned, and would exist
from the nature of the office, in the absence of a constitutional provision
expressly conferring it.' '40
In Queen Insurance Co. v. State41 the attorney general sought to prevent
a corporate combination which would have created a fire insurance monop-
oly. The court stated that the attorney general's duty to institute necessary
proceedings to protect the public is subject to statutory direction; where there
is no such statutory control, the attorney general is free to pursue any remedy
suited to the nature of the cause of action.42
II. STATE V. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO.
In State v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. the Texas Supreme Court
upheld the right of the attorney general to bring suit in the public interest
to enjoin a proposed action not authorized by law by a public utility. More-
over, the court recognized the concomitant jurisdiction of the courts to enter-
tain such suits and to issue necessary orders pursuant to that jurisdiction.
In considering the jurisdictional issue, the court of civil appeals 43 had dealt
solely with the issue of judicial review of telephone rates. After distinguish-
ing the propitious list of supporting authorities presented by the attorney gen-
eral, 44 the court found that, in determining whether a proposed rate was
unreasonable, the trial court would be required to hear evidence identical to
that considered by an administrator or legislative body in setting the appro-
priate rate. Thus, it concluded that the district court's action in finding that
no rate increase was justified was tantamount to judicial rate making. 45
39. It was on this point that the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that there
must be a public benefit as a direct consequence of court action by the attorney general.
The company would not have been required to reduce its charges since they were within
the legislative rate structure. The mere possibility of savings passed to the consumer
was held insufficient to sustain the action.
40. 81 Tex. at 551, 17 S.W. at 66. See also Boyd v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 145 Tex.
206, 196 S.W.2d 497 (1946); Agey v. American Liberty Pipe Line Co., 141 Tex. 478.
172 S.W.2d 972 (1943); Powers v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Tex. 604, 161 S.W.2d 273
(1942); Allred v. Beggs, 125 Tex. 584, 84 S.W.2d 223 (1935); Brady v. Brooks, 99 Tex.
366, 89 S.W. 1052 (1905); State ex rel. Templeton v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 11 S.W.
119 (1888); Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887).
41. 22 S.W. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W.
397 (1893).
42. 22 S.W. at 1052.
43. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 523 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin),
rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).
44. Id. at 70 n.1. See, e.g., City of Nassau Bay v. Nassau Bay Tel. Co., 517 S.W.2d
613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Tel. Co.
v. Cities Littlefield, 498 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
City of Carrollton v. Southwestern States Tel. Co., 381 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Memorial Bend Util. Co., 331
S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. 523 S.W.2d at 70. It is possible to reconcile this holding with that of the su-
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The supreme court dealt at length with the jurisdictional issue and
reversed, relying on early -United States Supreme Court decisions 46 holding
that a public utility is, in the absence of regulation, always subject to the dic-
tates of reasonableness, since it is a corporation "affected with a public inter-
est."'47 The most important aspect of the case is the Texas Supreme Court's
approval of the attorney general's authority to institute suit. While the deci-
sion appears at first glance to extend the attorney general's powers under the
article of the Texas Constitution allowing suits against private corporations, 48
the decision is probably based upon a more restrictive view. The court
determined from the record that Southwestern Bell was collecting a "toll" for
its services and attempting to exact an unreasonable rate which was not
authorized by law. 40 9Hence, the case fell neatly within the framework of
the constitutional provision 0 and the accompanying statute,51 thereby avoid-
ing the necessity for inquiry into the nature of the powers inherent in the
office of the attorney general.
The court approved language in State v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.52 that
the attorney general may institute suit preventing the exercise by a private
corporation of a power not authorized by law if the exercise of such power
would be harmful to some interest essentially public. 53  Thus, while plainly
not required for the precise holding, the broad language employed by the
court provides a springboard for potential advancement of the inherent com-
mon law powers theory, particularly since the court distinguished early cases
limiting the powers of the office as not germane to the issue presented. 54
preme court since the court of civil appeals determined that the district court had re-
strained all rate increases and had thereby determined "that the existing rate was ade-
quate." If the appeals court decision is limited in this fashion it squares with the su-
preme court decision modifying the final order by restraining solely the proposed in-
crease. This type of order would determine only that the proposed rate was too high
without implying which rates would be considered legally allowable.
46. 526 S.W.2d at 529-30, citing, inter alia, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898);
ICC v. Railway Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897); C. & L. Turnpike Rd. v. Sandford, 164 U.S.
578 (1896); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Chicago, M.
& St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S, 418 (1890) (all distinguishing rate reviewing from
rate making; holding only the latter a legislative function).
47. Southwestern Bell placed the court in a rather precarious position by arguing
that since the FCC regulated interstate rates and applicable state law permitted regulation
of intracity rates by municipal governments, in the absence of legislative regulation the
company could legally charge at will for intrastate long distance phone calls without ac-
counting to anyone. If the courts were held without jurisdiction, all remedies would be
precluded, even those of private individuals, as well as class action measures under TEx.
R. Civ. P. 42. The court referred to the Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1975, ch.
721, [1975] Tex. Laws 2327, which will not effectively begin to regulate utilities rates
until September 1, 1976, but did not consider this a legislative recognition of lack of
jurisdiction in the courts. 526 S.W.2d at 528 n.1.
48. See Shepperd, supra note 17; Taylor, supra note 18.
49. 526 S.W.2d at 531, citing Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 109 Tex. 337,
207 S.W. 308 (1918). In Southwestern Tel. & Tel. the court simply referred to the rates
charged by plaintiff as "tolls" without discussing the importance of their terminology.
Consequently, for constitutional construction at least, telephone rates fall within the am-
bit of TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
50. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
51. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4409 (1966). General statutes dealing with the
office of the attorney general are TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4394-4413a (1966).
52. 81 Tex. 530, 17 S.W. 60 (1891); see notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
53. 526 S.W.2d at 531.
54. Id., distinguishing Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. 261, 285 S.W.2d 191 (1955);
State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
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Upon consideration of the broad use of Farmers', an apropos conclusion
might be that the restrictive cases will be limited factually or will be reconciled
with the general American rule upholding inherent attorney general common
law authority.55
The many questions concerning the authority of the attorney general in
areas where a regulatory body exists remain unresolved.5 6 Southwestern Bell
appears to resolve doubts as to the ability of the attorney general to act as
a consumer advocate in the district courts where no regulatory scheme exists.
It thus seems clear that there is no constitutional restraint on the attorney
general's powers in terms of the public interest suit, at least in the absence
of legislative regulation. 57 Southwestern Bell sheds no light, however, on the
extent of those powers unless the decision is broadly interpreted beyond its
apparent precedential value. Moreover, an excellent argument can be made
urging that the case be limited to its facts since there was no administrative
regulation exercised over an essentially monopolistic enterprise.5 8
Additional arguments may be advanced supporting a limited reading of the
decision. The court emphasized that Southwestern Bell was a monopoly and
a business affected with a public interest. 59 Thus, the precise scope of
attorney general powers in the regulation of private corporations in the public
interest may differ between corporations "affected with a public interest" and
businesses in which the public is but incidentally interested. 60 This will re-
quire examination of the nature of the public interest sought to be vindicated
and a defining of a public interest, or of a business affected therewith.6 1 Fur-
ther, had Southwestern Bell not been charging a toll for its services, it may be
1944, writ refd w.o.m.); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
55. See Shepperd, supra note 17, at 1-2 n.3 and accompanying text, citing cases indi-
cating the 35 jurisdictions recognize common law powers in their attorneys general.
56. Legislation establishing a regulatory body may curtail or pre-empt the inherent
power of the office, and may even infringe upon the furtherance of constitutionally im-
posed duties. See note 31 supra and accompanying text (example of exceptions which
may result from construction of legislation establishing the administrative body). See
also Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1975, ch. 721, [1975] Tex. Laws 2327; note 58
infra.
57. See note 47 supra.
58. Southwestern Bell argued essentially that between FCC regulation and municipal
regulation authorized by the state legislature, the gap of intrastate rates was created by
inadequate legislation and Southwestern Bell was basically unregulated. The court of
civil appeals suggested that it could not fashion the appropriate remedy solely because
the legislature had failed to provide the proper regulation. 523 S.W.2d at 71. Addition-
ally, the legislature remains free to preclude the common law powers of the attorney
general as has been done in environmental litigation. See note 30 supra. Ordinarily
some procedure is established in regulatory legislation providing for proper appeals. See
Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1975, ch. 721, i[1975] Tex. Laws 2327 (effective over
rates September 1, 1976).
59. 526 S.W.2d at 529.
60. Enforcement powers over a corporation would not necessarily include an atttack
against an entire industry. However, it has been indicated that most corporations af-
fected with a public interest are utility monopolies wherein an attack against the corpo-
ration is effectively an attack against the industry. See City of Texarkana v. Wiggins,
151 Tex. 100, 246 S.W.2d 622 (1952). See also Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048
(Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893) (unlawful
attempted corporate combination).
61. See City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 104, 246 S.W.2d 622, 624
(1952) (defining business affected with a public interest as "what has come to be known
as a utility service"). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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argued that different results would have obtained. In the absence of toll charg-
es, the issue would have devolved upon an interpretation of the "power...
not authorized by law" provision. This would have forced the court specific-
ally to confront the question of common law powers which now remains an
issue in doubt.8 2
III. CONCLUSION
Recent legislative activity has dealt with the authority of the attorney
general. The Sixty-Fourth Legislature adopted the Public Utilities Regula-
tory Act providing for administrative regulation of tolls and rates of public
utilities, 63 and proposed a new state constitution, which stated that "[t]he
attorney general has the powers of the office as at common law except as
expressly provided by law to the contrary. '64
Despite the rejection of the proposed constitution by the voters, it is pre-
dicted that the supreme court will find common law powers within the attor-
ney general's office. The court could easily broaden the definition of the
"power . . .not authorized by law" provision of the present constitution"
and thereby avoid the inevitable difficulty of distinguishing between taxes,
tolls, freights, and wharfages, and an ordinary charge or price. While South-
western Bell plainly does not require this construction, the trend of decisions
indicates such a result.66 This extension should not require a constitutional
amendment, 67 but merely judicial expansion of present constitutional provi-
sions" limited by the requirement of a showing of injury to the public inter-
est.69 In sum, the court indicated its readiness to uphold common law
attorney general powers when presented with a case clearly requiring direct
confrontation of the issue.
Brian D. Lafving
62. See notes 31-42 supra and accompanying text.
63. Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1975, ch. 721, [1975] Tex. Laws 2327. The
act provides that any party to the proceeding before the commission is entitled to judicial
review. The attorney general is empowered to act on his own initiative where the viola-
tion of a portion of the Act has occurred; however, the attorney general must have the
approval of the commission before an injunction may be sought. Id. §§ 69, 71, 72(c),
at 2349.
64. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (proposed) (defeated by Texas voters Nov. 4, 1975).
The proposed constitution, in the same section, also provided that the attorney general
should take action as "necessary to prevent a private corporation from exercising a
power not authorized by law" and omitted the taxes, tolls, freight, and wharfage section
of the present constitution. TEx. CONsT. art. IV, § 22. Thus, while dispensing with
the precise provision upon which Southwestern Bell is based, the proposed constitution
expressly provided for the exercise of common law powers.
Additionally, the proposed constitution limited the authority of district and county at-
torneys to criminal prosecutions in courts below the court of appeals. TEx. CONST. art.
V, § 11 (proposed) (defeated by Texas voters Nov. 4, 1975). All other powers and
duties of the county and district attorneys were to be derived from a specific legislative
mandate. These provisions would have avoided the conflict presented between article
IV, § 22 and article V, § 21 of the present constitution. See notes 6-29 supra and ac-
companying text.
65. T.x. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
66. See authorities throughout Shepperd, supra note 17.
67. This statement assumes Southwestern Bell's construction as a limitation on ear-
lier cases with contrary implications. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
68. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
69. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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United Housing Foundation v. Forman: Shares of Stock in
Nonprofit Housing Cooperative Are Not "Securities"
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit membership
organization composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and civic
groups, was established for the purpose of providing adequate housing
accommodations for low and moderate income families. UHF in turn organ-
ized the Riverbay Corporation, a nonprofit organization to own and operate
the land and buildings constituting Co-Op City,' the largest housing coopera-
tive in New York City. As a prerequisite to living in Co-Op City, residents
were required to purchase shares of stock in Riverbay.2 Resident tenants
of Co-op City brought a class action in federal court,3 claiming they were
defrauded in their purchase of the shares by certain misrepresentations in the
cooperative's information bulletin. 4 The district court dismissed, finding
that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the shares of stock in the
cooperative housing project were not "securities" within the scope of the fed-
eral securities acts. 5 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that the shares were both "stock" and "investment contracts" and, therefore,
were "securities." 6  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1. The project was organized pursuant to the New York State Private Housing Fi-
nance Law, commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act. In return for the developer's
agreement to operate on a nonprofit basis and the state's power to review the develop-
ment of the cooperative, New York provided the developer with large, long-term, low-
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. See N.Y. Piuv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§§ 11-37 (McKinney 1962), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
2. The shares of stock could not be transferred to a non-tenant; they could not
be pledged or encumbered; they would descend, along with the apartment, only to a sur-
viving spouse; and, they carried no voting rights. If a tenant wished to terminate his
occupancy and was forced to vacate, he was required to offer the stock back to River-
bay at its original selling price per share, or if Riverbay declined to repurchase, the ten-
ant had to sell the stock for not more than the initial purchase price plus a fraction
of the portion of the corporation's mortgage that the stock had paid off. See id. §
31(a), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975). Less than 10% of the total estimated cost
of the project was to be raised by the sale of stock to tenants. The bulk of the cost
was to be financed by a long-term low-interest mortgage loan from the New York Pri-
vate Housing Finance Agency.
3. Named as defendants were UHF, Riverbay, Community Services, Inc. (CSI),
the general contractor and sales agent for the project, as well as individual directors of
UHF, Riverbay, and CSI, the State of New York, and the State Private Housing Finance
Agency.
4. The crux of the claim was that the information bulletin represented that CSI,
the contractor of the project, would bear all subsequent cost increases resulting from
such factors as inflation, when, in fact, the cost of a four-room apartment had risen from
$92.08 in 1965 to $158.72 in 1975. Plaintiffs claimed that these misrepresentations
were in violation of Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and
SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), promulgated under Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
5. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"The term 'security' means any note, stock ...certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement .. . investment contract . . .or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a 'security' . ... " Securities Act of 1933, §
2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970). A "virtually identical" definition of a security is
provided in Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)(1970). Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). See SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEDERAL SECURITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
6. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in
53 TExAs L. REv. 623 (1975).
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Held, reversed: Shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment
in a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing corporation are not
"securities" within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
95 S. Ct. 2051, 44 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1975).
I. DEFINITION OF SECURITIES
The definition of "security ' 7 has undergone extensive evolution and growth
since federal regulation began under the Securities Act of 1933.8 The initial
desire of Congress for an expansive rather than a restrictive concept,9 coupled
with the recent increase in potential liability under the securities acts,10 has
made litigation over the definition of "security" vital to all segments of the
business community." The Supreme Court first dealt with this issue in SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,'2 when it ruled that an oil leasehold arrange-
ment being sold by the defendant was not merely an interest in land, but
was a type of security "in which the purchaser was paying both for a lease
and a development project."' 8 Shortly thereafter, the Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co. determined that the defendant's contracts for the sale and cultiva-
tion of citrus groves were securities, again holding that form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis placed upon economic reality.' 4 Twen-
ty years later, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, the Court for a third time emphasized
the "substance over form" analysis in finding that withdrawable capital shares
in a savings and loan association were securities.' 5 These cases clearly
demonstrate the Court's commitment to looking to the economic substance of
a transaction in reaching "[n]ovel, uncommon, irregular devices,"' 16 which
Congress sought to subject to the provisions of -the federal securities laws.' 7
Another problem has arisen where a transaction is labeled a security but
fails to meet the substantive tests.' 8 Certain dictum in Joiner tends to sup-
port a so-called "literal approach" to finding a security. There, the Court
remarked: "Instruments may be included within any of these definitions, as
7. See note 5 supra.
8. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 455-512 (2d ed. 1961, Supp.
1962); 4 id. at 2485-557 (2d ed. 1969); Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept,
49 ILL. B.J. 72,8 (1961).
9. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL SUPERVI-
SION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
10. The greatest increase in liability has been under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1974). For a discussion of its scope see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5, § 2.2 (1974).
11. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367-68 & n.8 (1967).
12. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
13. Id. at 349. The court looked to the "economic interest" in the well-drilling
undertaking in determining that the leaseholds were securities. Id.; see text accompany-
ing note 22 infra.
14. 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); see notes 23-24 infra and accompanying text.
15. 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
16. 320 U.S. at 351.
17. See Comment, What Is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, and Franchise
Agreements, 22 KAN. L. REV. 55, 59 (1973).
18. See notes 21-22 infra and accompanying text.
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matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description."' 19 In
exposing the fallacy of the literal approach, one commentator has noted that,
"just as some things which look like real estate are securities, some things
which look like securities are real estate." °20 Despite this dictum in Joiner,
the literal approach has received little approval by the courts.2 '
Certainly the holding in Joiner was not based on a literal approach in
determining that an oil leasehold was a security. Rather, the inquiry in
Joiner was directed at the "character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic induce-
ments held out to the prospect."'22 More specific criteria for determining the
existence of a security were provided by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co. 23 where the Court defined a security as "a contract, transaction,
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party
... ".4 Although the Howey test has become the most frequently cited
formulation of the investment contract, 25 it has not been uniformly inter-
preted. The first part of the test, an investment of money, is self-explanatory
and has received little attention by the courts. 26  Although "common enter-
prise" has caused some litigation, 27 the most troublesome aspects have been
the third, "expectation of profits," and fourth, "solely from the efforts of
others," elements of the Howey test. 28
It is significant that the third component of the Howey formula is the ex-
19. 320 U.S. at 351.
20. 1 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 492-93. Although Professor Loss seemingly adheres
to the "substance over form" analysis, he has also stated: "When the ownership of an
individual apartment is evidenced by stock in the cooperative, as it usually is, the federal
and state securities statutes would seem literally to apply." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, Professor Marsh has remarked: "When a stock corporation is used, the Se-
curities Acts literally apply, even though the profit motive is not dominant." R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 300 (3d ed. 1972). But see Coffey, supra
note 11, at 403-07. Indeed, the federal statute states that stock is not a security if "the
context otherwise requires." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(a) (1970).
21. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354(7th Cir. 1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
But see 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
22. 320 U.S. at 352-53.
23. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
24. Id. at 298-99. The Court's test was adopted from the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).
25. The Howey Court noted that the term "investment contract" was undefined by
the securities acts. 328 U.S. at 298. Left to judicial interpretation, the Court remarked
that the term should embody "a flexible rather than a static principle." Id. at 299. Pro-
fessor Loss describes the term "investment contract" as a "catchall." 1 L. Loss, supra
note 8, at 483. See also Note, Securities Regulation-Securities Defined-Investor Par-
ticipation as Limitation on Statutory Definition, 48 TUL. L. REV. 738, 740 (1974).
26. See Long, An Attempt To Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 143 (1971).
27. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rochkind v.
Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975). See also Long, supra note. 26,
at 143-44.
28. See generally Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condo-
miniums, Homes, and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411 (1975); Long, supra note 27; Com-
ment, supra note 17; Note, Securities Law-Investment Contracts, 6 CREIGHTON L. REv.
450 (1973); Note, Securities Law-Co-Op Apartments--Shares of a Cooperative Hous-
ing Corporation Are Securities, 62 GEO. L.J. 1515 (1974); Note, supra note 25.
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pectation, not the realization, of profit. The expectation element has been
criticized because attention is drawn away from the risk of immediate loss of
initial investment by emphasizing the promise of future profits. 29 In addition,
the word "profit" itself has created interpretative dilemmas. Although
some courts have strictly construed the definition of profit,30 other courts
have avoided a narrow construction in either of two ways. The first method,
the "risk capital" analysis, was formulated by the California Supreme Court
in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.," In that case, a purchaser of a
membership in a then-unfinished country club was deemed to have invested
in a security, even though he received no interest in the profits of the club.
Without a reference to Howey, the court emphasized the risk of the pur-
chaser's capital investment rather than any profit he might receive.32 Al-
though Silver Hills was decided under state security laws,3 8 it has affected
federal3 4 as well as other state court decisions.8 5 The second approach to
a less restrictive construction of the term "profit" involves expanding the
term to include "benefit." 36 Thus, using this broader definition, there is
29. See note 32 infra.
30. Where investors were promised a fixed fee instead of a share of the profits, somejurisdictions have held there is no profit motivation and hence no security. Emery v.
So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Civ. App. 1964); Pennsylvania Sec.
Comm'r v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964);
cf. People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 602-03 (1951). This reasoning
has been criticized because it fails to view profits from the point of view of the offeree
and instead only looks at the balance sheet of the offeror corporation. See State v.
Hawaii Market Center, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105, 110 (1971). See also Long, supra
note 26, at 144.
31. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). However, Professor
Long argues that the "risk capital" concept pre-dates Silver Hills. See Long, supra note
26, at 168-69.
Silver Hills has been profusely treated by many legal scholars. See generally Coffey,
supra note 11; Long, supra note 26; Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or
Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REV. 465 (1965); Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California:
Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1963); Note, Securities Regulation:
"Beneficial Interest in Title to Property" as a Security, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 156 (1962).
32. Expanding the Silver Hills concept, Professor Coffey contends that the risk to
capital investment is the distinguishing feature of a security and that too much emphasis
has been placed on the inducement of future profits. See Coffey, supra note 11, at 375.
See also Note, Securities--Shares in Cooperative Housing Corporations Subject to Fed-
eral Securities Regulations, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1289, 1300 n.45 (1974).
33. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1975).
34. One federal court has approved the risk capital analysis of Silver Hills. SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973). Other federal courts have alluded to Silver Hills on the risk capital issue,
but have avoided adopting the concept as a basis for decision. See, e.g., Bitter v. Hoby's
Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1974); Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lum's, Inc.,
484 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1973); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 258-61(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646-47
(D. Colo. 1970), a/I'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). At least one court has expressly
rejected Silver Hills. L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.J. 1974).
35. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has accepted the Silver Hills analysis. State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105, 109-10 (1971). At least
two courts have held that the Silver Hills analysis is compatible with Howey. Gibbs
v. State, 209 S.E.2d 691, 695-96 (Ga. Civ. App. 1974); State v. Consumer Business Sys-
tem, Inc., 482 F.2d 549 (Ore. Civ. App. 1971).
36. From an economic standpoint, "profit" is anything that increases one's satisfac-
tion or utility-the benefit does not need to be monetary in nature. See generally P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 618-26 (9th ed. 1973). The expansion of the term "profit" oc-
curs most often in the context of housing cooperatives. See, e.g., State ex rel. Russel
v. Sweeny, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); Pine Grove Manor,
Inc. v. Director, 68 N.J. Super. 135, 151, 171 A.2d 676, 685 (N.J. App. 1961); Coin-
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support for the position that stock in a housing cooperative is a "security"
because the investor is benefited by the use of an apartment, and other
advantages such as lower rental rates and certain tax deductions."r
The obscurity of definition of the "profit" element is apparent when consid-
ering whether stock in a housing cooperative is a "security." Not only is the
tension heightened between the "substance over form" concept and the "lit-
eral approach," but Howey's requirement of an "expectation of profit" must
be squarely confronted. The few state courts that faced this issue held that
stock in a housing cooperative is not a "security." 38 The thrust of these deci-
sions was that the purchase of stock in a housing cooperative is motivated
by homeownership, similar to an ordinary real estate transaction rather than
an investment with a view toward profit.a9
The Securities Exchange Commission took an ambiguous position as to
whether shares of stock in housing cooperatives are securities. SEC rule 235
exempts cooperative housing transactions from the registration requirement
under certain conditions. 40  It has been argued that rule 235 negatively
implies that cooperative housing stock is a security, since the SEC would not
have exempted a particular transaction unless it was thought to be a secu-
rity. 41 However, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 concerning residential
real estate offerings casts considerable doubt on the negative implication argu-
ment.42 The release sets forth guidelines to distinguish between those hous-
ing arrangements entered into for investment versus those simply for living
purposes, the latter not being encompassed by the securities laws. Al-
monwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 183 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1962); State ex rel. Troy v.
Lumberman's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P.2d 812 (1936); cf. Davenport v. United
States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958); Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp.
1294, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. See Miller, supra note 31, at 481. At least one commentator has speculated that
"a cooperative housing corporation share is a 'security' and is within the ambit of fed-
eral securities regulation." Note, Cooperative Housing Corporation and the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 132 (1971). However, Professor Miller has in-
dicated that, "so long as profit does not mean benefit (as it has not) and so long as
profit is the often unspoken but essential element of motivation in securities sales and
purchases, federal securities law should not apply." Miller, supra note 31, at 496. See
also Note, Securities Law-Co-Op Apartments--Shares of a Cooperative Housing Cor-
poration Are Securities, 62 GEo. L.J. 1515, 1529 (1974).
38. Only three state courts have dealt with this specific issue. Willmont v. Tellone,
137 So. 2d 610 (Fla. App. 1962); Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d
116 (1953); State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956). However,
McMahon is of questionable validity within Illinois. See Note, Cooperative Housing
Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 130 n.38 (1971).
'See generally Miller, supra note 31, at 474-86. At least one federal court has held that
shares of stock in a housing cooperative constitute a security. 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1975 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See generally Miller, supra note 31, at 474-86; Note, supra note 38, at 128-32.
The "risk capital" and "benefit" analyses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For
example, if "profit" is viewed as synonymous with "benefit," then some "profit" can be
ascertained in the Silver Hills transaction. See Coffey, supra note 11, at 403; Note,
Franchise Sales: Are They Sales of Securities?, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 383, 390 (1970).
However, Professor Miller argues that the "risk" analysis replaces the "profit" test. See
Miller, supra note 32, at 478. See also Note, supra note 38, at 130.
40. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 235 (1973).
41. Note, supra note 38, at 127. But see 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 493-94.
42. Some commentators have argued that the exemption was devised by the SEC
to avoid the cooperative housing issue. See Zammit, Securities Law Aspects of Coopera-




though the release primarily pertained to condominiums, traditionally a dis-
tinct realty concept, some commentators contended that condominiums and
cooperatives are virtually identical.4 3 Thus, its effect on housing cooperatives
was unclear. 44 Against this background of the enigmatic concept of "profit,"
and an ambiguous position by the SEC, the time was ripe for the Supreme
Court to decide whether shares of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative
are securities within the scope of the federal securities laws.45
II. UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. V. FORMAN
The Supreme Court, in holding that shares of stock in a state subsidized
and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative are not "securities," based its
decision on two primary determinations. Initially, the Court revalidated the
axiom that form should be disregarded for substance. 46 Holding for the first
time that a certain transaction was not a security, the Supreme Court used
the "substance over form" analysis to preclude, rather than evoke, 47 applica-
tion of the securities acts. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected
the "literal approach" because of its incompatibility with the "substance over
form" concept.48 The Court recognized that the intent of Congress was to
apply the securities laws to economic transactions, and that the application
of the laws should "turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction,"
and not on the name.49
The second, and more significant determination by the Court was that
shares of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative do not constitute "invest-
43. See Berman & Stone, supra note 28, at n.49; Parness, Stock in Cooperative
Apartment Corporation as a Security Under Federal Securities Laws, 9 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 259, 264-65 (1974). See generally Rohen, The Securities Law Implica-
tions of Condominium Marketing Programs Which Feature a Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L.
REv. 1 (1969).
44. The release states, "Although this release speaks in terms of condominiums it
applies to offerings of all types of units in real estate developments which have charac-
teristics similar to those described herein." Release No. 5347, supra note 42. The
Commissioner, at one point in the release, uses the phrase "cooperative unit." Id. See
Berman & Stone, supra note 28, at 424-25; Note, Securities Law-Co-Op Apartments-
Shares of a Cooperative Housing Corporation Are Securities, 62 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1528
n.65 (1974).
45. Congress also has begun to awaken to the securities problems surrounding con-
dominiums and cooperatives as evidenced by its commissioning the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development to study the need and feasibility of federal regulation. See
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 821 (Aug.
22, 1974). See also Note, Securities Regulation-Shares of a State-Subsidized Non-
profit Cooperative Housing Corporation Are Securities Under Federal Securities Laws,
53 TEXAS L. REV. 623, 634 n.56 (1975).
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2058, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 630.
47. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351
(1943). However, some circuit courts have held certain instruments not to be securities.
See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah
v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf. Continental Mktg.
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905
(1968); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746, 750-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
768 (1944); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir. 1973).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 2058-59, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 630-31.
49. Id. at 2059, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 630. Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas and White, referred to the Joiner dictum in adhering to the
"literal approach." 95 S. Ct. at 2067, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 639-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
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ment contracts" as defined by the Howey test.50 Reaffirming the Joiner and
Tcherepnin definitions of profit,51 the Court placed greatest emphasis on the
presence or absence of a profit motive in determining that this stock was not
a security. The Court examined the aggregate characteristics of the coopera-
tive's stock, determining that the motivation of purchasers was solely to
acquire subsidized low-cost living spaces.5 2
By stressing -the motivation of the purchaser in respect to profit expecta-
tion, the Court could have concluded its decision by holding that the Howey
test of expectation of profit was not met because Riverbay stock was not an
investment for profit.53 Instead, the Court went on to refine the definition
of profit as it applies to the investment contract concept. First, the Court
found that the deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the monthly
rental charge applied to interest on the mortgage did not constitute "profit."'5 4
The Court held next that savings in rent could not properly be considered
an appropriate "theory of 'profits'" because the benefit could not be liqui-
dated into cash.15 Third, the possibility of net income derived from leasing
commercial facilities was considered. The Court hesitantly admitted that this
may have been a form of "profit," but even if it had been, it was "far too
speculative and insubstantial" to bring the transaction within the securities
acts.58
These three findings have the potential of substantially affecting securities
law. Profit undoubtedly means more than mere non-pecuniary benefit,57
since even some forms of economic benefit, such as rental savings and tax
deductions, do not satisfy United Housing's definition of "profit."5 8 But the
Court indicated that even income which is found to be profit, if it is "too
speculative and insubstantial," does not come within the scope of the securi-
ties laws.5 9 The "speculative and insubstantial" finding is especially signifi-
cant in that it departs from the literal language of Howey. The Court under-
50. Id. at 2060, 2062, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 632, 634; see note 24 supra and accompany-
ing text.
51. "By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment [Joiner] ... or a participation in earnings re-
sulting from the use of investors' funds [Tcherepnin] .... ".95 S. Ct. at 2060, 44
L. Ed. 2d at 632.
52. Id. at 2060, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 631-32. The ambiguous stance of the SEC as to
whether "stock" of this nature is a "security," was further complicated by the SEC's ami-
cus brief, urging the Court to find the federal securities laws applicable to this case. See
notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. Taking note of the SEC's inconsistent posi-
tion, the Court refused to give any significance to the Commission's brief. 95 S. Ct.
at 2063-64 n.24, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 635-36 n.24.
53. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
54. 95 S. Ct. at 2062, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 634. This tax deduction is available through
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 216. Although the court of appeals held tax deductions were
a form of "profit," 500 F.2d at 1254, the legislative history of the Code indicates that
these deductions were incident to home ownership, not investment. See Note, supra note
44, at 1522-23.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2062, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 634.
56. Id. The dissent centered on this issue, Justice Brennan contending that River-
bay, as a lessor of commercial and office space, was gathering substantial revenues,
therefore enabling the corporation to curb spiraling rental rates. 95 S. Ct. at 2064-65,
44 L. Ed. 2d at 637. The dissent also argued that tax benefits are a form of "profit."
Id. at 2064-65, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 637-38.
57. See notes 36, 37 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2062, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 634.
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took to place quantitative limits on the profit requirement which are in no
way suggested in Howey.
Finally, the Court took note of the risk capital concept,60 but declined to
discuss its validity. Justice Powell remarked that even if the Court were will-
ing to adopt that test, it would be inapplicable because the purchasers of
apartments in Co-Op City took no significant risk.61 Although the Supreme
Court disclaimed any position on the validity of the risk capital test, it is clear
that the Court's focus was upon motivation of investment and the nature of
profit, not upon the risk to initial investment, in determining that Riverbay
stock was not a security.
I1. CONCLUSION
The extraordinary growth of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts6 2
has accelerated the definitional expansion of a "security." The only reason
the plaintiffs in United Housing desired to have Riverbay "stock" treated as
a "security," was to obtain the protection of the federal securities laws. Both
United Housing and its companion case, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,63 indicate a developing conservative trend of the present Court in
the field of securities law. Although fear of the expansion of the antifraud
provisions was not treated, the Court is clearly limiting the number of persons
who will be afforded -the protection of the federal securities laws.
The holding of United Housing sets forth for the first time criteria for
determining what is not a security. The Second Circuit had erroneously
reasoned that the "substance" of the commercial transaction was being
scrutinized when it found Riverbay stock to be a "security." The Supreme
Court re-examined the "substance over form" analysis and concluded that the
"economic reality" of Riverbay stock was something different from what the
circuit court found it to be. Although the Court recognized that the term
"security" is to be broadly interpreted, it nonetheless placed some limits on
a concept which had at times seemed unbounded. The Court's willingness
to delineate the profit requirement may extend to the other elements of
Howey as well. The impact of United Housing will be minimized if courts,
by limiting the case to its facts, stress the government supported and nonprofit
foundation aspects of the decision. In any event, United Housing casts a
new light on the continually developing body of law concerning the defini-
tional complexities of a security, and may mark the beginning of a period
in which the heretofore expanding concept of securities begins to stabilize.
Robert Thompson Mowry
60. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
61. 95 S. Ct. at 2063 n,23, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 635 n.23.
62. See generally A. BROMBERO, supra note 10.
63. 95 S. Ct. 1917, 44 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1975); see Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Store: Affirmation of the Birnbaum Doctrine, p. 951 supra.
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